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Glossary of Terms 
Please note that the following definitions have been formulated in the context of 
text based Information Retrieval (IR) and Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE). 
Collection: A set of Documents  (Manning et al., 2008, p.4).  The term Corpus or 
Database is sometimes used as an alternative to Collection (Song et al., 2000; 
Manning et al., 2008, p.4).  
Document: A digital text file.  For Example:  PDF, DOC, DOCX, TXT, HTML. 
Document Relevance: A Document is considered Relevant if it contains information 
of value in relation to a person’s Information Need (Manning et al., 2008, p.5). 
Dictionary: ‘A […] resource containing […] the Words of a language, giving 
information about their meanings, pronunciations, etymologies, inflected forms, 
derived forms, etc.’ (Dictionary.com, 2015a). 
Free Text Query: A Query expressed in a natural language (For Example: English) 
without the use of formal operators (For Example:  Boolean Operators)  (Manning et 
al., 2008, p.14).  A Free Text Query consists of one or more Terms. 
Information Need: A topic about which a person wishes to learn/know more about 
(Manning et al., 2008, p.5).  An Information Need is typically conveyed as a Query. 
Information Retrieval (IR): The act of locating Documents from within a Collection 
that satisfies a person’s Information Need (Manning et al., 2008, p.1). 
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Information Retrieval Operation: The act of using an Information Retrieval System. 
Information Retrieval System: A software system that performs Information 
Retrieval (Manning et al., 2008, p.2).  In order to use an Information Retrieval 
System, a person must first input their Information Need in to the system in the 
form of a Query.  In turn, the Query is utilised by the Information Retrieval System 
to determine the Relevance of the Documents contained within the Collection (with 
respect to the specified Query).  Once the contents of the Collection have been 
examined, the set of Documents considered Relevant; that is, the Search Results, 
are returned to the user of the system.  Internet Search Engines and Operating 
System File Search Functions are particularly prevalent example of Information 
Retrieval Systems (Manning et al., 2008, p.5).   
Query: One or more Terms chosen to convey a person’s Information Need 
(Manning et al., 2008, p.5), typically in the form of a Free Text Query (Manning et 
al., 2008, p.14). 
Query Term: An individual, unspecified Term that occurs within the text associated 
with a Free Text Query. 
Search: See Information Retrieval.  Used Interchangeably. 
Searchable Encryption: Information Retrieval performed on a Collection consisting 
of encrypted text Documents.  The Documents within the Collection remain 
encrypted at all times, while the Query specified by the user is encrypted prior to 
being utilised in the Information Retrieval Operation that follows (Song et al., 2000). 
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Search Operation: See Information Retrieval Operation.  Used Interchangeably. 
Search Result: The set of Documents (from within a Collection) considered Relevant 
after Information Retrieval has been performed. 
Search String: See Free Text Query.  Used interchangeably. 
Term: The individual space delimited text units that make up the contents of both 
Documents and Free Text Queries.  Given that it is commonplace for Documents 
and Free Text Queries to contain text not classified as Words (For Example:  K-9, 
Blink-182), Term is used instead to describe the individual space delimited text units 
that make up the contents of both Documents and Free Text Queries.  It should be 
noted that all Words are classified as Terms, but not all Terms are classified as 
Words (Manning et al., 2008, p.3-4).  For Example:  ‘the’ is both a Word and a Term; 
‘asdfg’ is a Term, but not a Word. 
Word: An individual unit of a given language (Dictionary.com, 2015b) (For Example:  
‘a’, ‘the’, ‘from’, etc.), listed as an entry in the Dictionary of the associated language 
(Manning et al., 2008, p.3-4).   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
This Document represents the author’s thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Dissertation module of the Master of Science in Computing in 
Systems and Software Security at Letterkenny Institute of Technology. 
1.2 Overview 
The concept of Cloud computing is now an accepted philosophy for computing.  As 
of 2014, 19% of all enterprises within the European Union utilise Cloud computing 
in some form or another (Eurostat, 2014), with industry forecasts indicating 
significant growth in the sector over the coming years (Columbus, 2015).  
The benefits of Cloud computing are significant: reduced costs, high reliability, as 
well as the immediate availability of additional computing resources as and when 
needed.  Despite such advantages, Cloud Service Provider (CSP) consumers need to 
be aware that the Clouds poses its own set of unique risks that are not typically 
associated with storing and processing one’s own data internally using privately 
owned infrastructure (Hashizume et al., 2013).   
Perhaps the most severe risk facing CSP consumers at present is the threat of data 
disclosure or data loss (OWASP, 2013).  Recent years have seen a number of such 
incidents occur, whereby organisations customer data – hosted on the Cloud - has 
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been leaked online (for hacktivism or vandalism purposes) or stolen for criminal 
purposes.  Victims of such attacks include large organisations such as Sony (Sony, 
2014), Adobe (Arkin, 2013) and Apple (Kerris and Muller, 2014). 
Cloud computing is made possible through the use of many technologies, including 
internet access, virtualisation and third party data centres.  As a result, Cloud 
computing has a much broader attack surface than that associated with storing and 
processing data internally using privately owned infrastructure.  The storing of 
consumer data online makes such information – potentially - accessible to anyone 
with a web browser, while the use of virtualisation technology has the potential to 
allow CSP consumers to gain access to other CSP consumer’s private data and/or 
applications (Zhang et al., 2012; Hashizume et al., 2013).  In addition, the use of 
third party data centres poses a number of potential risks, including employees of 
the CSP (both current and former) gaining access to private consumer data (either 
physically or via software) (Claycomb and Nicoll, 2012; Hashizume et al,. 2013; 
Intermedia.net, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2014). 
As a countermeasure to such attacks, various access controls are utilised:  In the 
case of online access to the CSP, such access controls typically take the form of 
usernames and passwords; In the case of virtualisation, such access controls 
typically take the form of logical data separation; and in the case of third party data 
centres, such access controls typically take the form of physical access controls (For 
Example: Locks, Keypads) (as well as software based access control) that prevent 
unauthorised CSP personnel from gaining access to user data (Hashizume et al., 
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2013).  In principle, all of the aforementioned access controls are sound; however in 
practice, such controls have been circumvented. 
In the event that any of the aforementioned access controls are compromised 
maliciously, the chances of a data breach occurring are high.  Should a data breach 
occur and the associated data is retrieved in encrypted form, the data is essentially 
useless to an attacker (unless the encryption algorithm utilised is weak and/or the 
attacker has some foreknowledge of the associated decryption key) (Zhang et al., 
2012; Hashizume et al, 2013); however, in the event that a data breach occurs and 
the associated data is retrieved in plaintext form, an organisations worst nightmare 
has become a reality.  What follows is typically a slew of press releases, negative 
publicity, damaged business reputations, and fines under various data protection 
laws (ICO, 2014; ICO, 2015; Levick.com, 2015). 
To reduce the impact of potential data breaches (and to provide privacy for CSP 
consumer data) CSPs typically employ the use of cryptography.  In a Cloud 
environment, cryptography is typically utilised for two purposes: security while data 
is at rest; and security while data is in transit.  Unfortunately the Cloud cannot 
guarantee the security of data during processing as the current limitations of 
cryptography prevent data from being processed in encrypted form. 
Given the fact that data is processed in unencrypted form, it is quite common for 
attackers to target data in use, rather than targeting data which is encrypted during 
storage and transit (Hashizume et al., 2013; OWASP, 2013). 
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At the time of writing2, an entity wishing to store its data within the Cloud must 
choose one of the following options: 
1. Store Data in Encrypted Form (Two Options Exist) 
A. Disclose Decryption Key(s) to Cloud Service Provider (CSP) OR 
B. Keep Decryption Key(s) Private 
2. Store Data in Unencrypted Form 
Option 1A requires encrypted data owners to disclose their decryption key(s) to 
CSPs.  This is due to the fact that data cannot be searched or operated on while in 
encrypted form.  In order to provide CSP customers with such functionality, CSPs 
require access to the necessary decryption key(s).  
Option 1B (Keeping Decryption Key(s) Private) represents the most secure sub-
option; however, as previously mentioned, CSP customers lose the ability to search 
or operate on their data while it is in encrypted form.  In order to utilise such 
functionality using Option 1B, CSP customers must download their data, decrypt it, 
and only then can it be searched and/or operated on.  While this approach may be 
fine for small amounts of data, it becomes increasingly inefficient and unwieldy as 
the amount of data increases.  In addition, should any changes be made to the data 
after it has been downloaded; the customer must then re-encrypt and re-uploaded 
the entire dataset to the Cloud.   
                                                     
 
2
 September 14
th
 2015 
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Option 2 avoids the use of encryption for data security.  Rather than relying on 
cryptography for data security; that is, the traditional approach to data security, 
this approach utilises the aforementioned approach of logically separating data 
(Mather et al., 2009, p.62). 
Evidently, none of the options available at present provide an adequate balance of 
data security and functionality.  Option 1A and Option 2 offer full functionality at 
the expense of data security, while Option 1B provides data security at the expense 
of any and all functionality (Mather et al., 2009, p.66).   
The ideal solution to achieving an optimal balance of data security and functionality 
within the Cloud involves the CSP having the ability to search and operate on data 
while it is in encrypted form – without having any knowledge of the associated 
decryption key(s), or the associated plaintext(s)  (Mather et al., 2009, p.62-63, 69). 
Two forms of encryption do in fact exist at present that make the above a reality.  
The first, known as Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows data to be operated 
on3 while in encrypted form (Gentry, 2009). The second, known as Searchable 
                                                     
 
3
 Given two single digit binary numbers N1 and N2, that is, 0 or 1, an encryption scheme is said to be 
Fully Homomorphic if it satisfies the following property: N1⊕ N2 = N3; EPK(N1) ⊕ EPK(N2) = EPK(N3); 
D
SK
(E
PK
(N3)) = N3, where ⊕ denotes both binary multiplication and binary addition, i.e. mod 2.   
 
An encryption scheme that satisfies the above property can be used to derive a software based 
NAND Logic Gate (which can in turn be used to derive the set of all other Boolean Logic Gates).  
Given the full set of Boolean Logic Gates, any Boolean Logic Circuit can be derived; therefore 
allowing encrypted data to be arbitrarily operated on in the exact same manner as plaintext data 
(albeit plaintext data is operated on at a hardware level; not a software level as is the case with Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption).  
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Encryption, allows for data to be searched while in encrypted form (see Information 
Retrieval (Page 5)) (Song et al., 2000). 
While being impressive in terms of its functionality and capabilities, FHE remains 
extremely slow when implemented in software (Gentry et al., 2015).  As such, its 
mass deployment and usage within the Cloud appears to be some way off. 
Searchable Encryption on the other hand has been shown to be sufficiently efficient 
on the few occasions that it has been implemented in software.  Despite being a 
relatively obscure form of Cryptography, a number of researchers in the area hold 
the opinion that Searchable Encryption is now at the point that it can be deployed 
and used within the Cloud (Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al,. 2013).  
Given its superior efficiency, the author has chosen to focus on the topic of 
Searchable Encryption for this dissertation.  The author’s decision to do so is 
motivated by the Clouds lack of support for true data security using encryption, as 
well as the Clouds lack of support for searching encrypted data.   
Used in the Cloud, Searchable Encryption has the ability to allow CSP customers to 
store their data in encrypted form, while retaining the ability to search that data 
without disclosing the associated decryption key(s) to CSPs (Song et al., 2000), that 
is, without compromising data security on the Server.   
Searchable Encryption is a diverse subject that exists in many forms.  While there 
are several methods of carrying out Searchable Encryption, two general techniques 
dominate the literature: Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE); that is, Searchable 
Encryption using Symmetric Key Cryptography and Public Key Encryption with 
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Keyword Search (PEKS); that is, Searchable Encryption using Public Key 
Cryptography (Boneh et al., 2004; Curtmola et al,. 2006; Bosch et al., 2014).  Neither 
SSE nor PEKS natively supports Searchable Encryption as it was originally envisioned 
by Song et al. (2000) (see Section 2.1).  Instead, the literature has focussed on 
adapting various forms of Indexes; that is, Data Structures that support efficient 
searching by pre-computing and mapping Search Terms to the Documents they 
occur in (and vice versa), for use with Information Retrieval (IR) over encrypted 
Documents (Bosch et al., 2014). 
Two forms of Indexes are discussed in the Searchable Encryption literature: 
Forward Indexes and Inverted Indexes (see Section 2.2).  While both Indexes store 
the exact same information, each Index is optimised for different forms of 
searching.  In the case of the Forward Index, it is optimised for searching specific 
Documents for the presence of Search Strings (Luenberger, 2006, p.285), while the 
Inverted Index is optimised for searching an entire Document Collection for the 
presence of Search Strings (Luenberger, 2006; p.286; Manning et al., 2008, p.6).  
Early work on the topic of Searchable Encryption focussed on the use of Forward 
Indexes almost exclusively (Goh, 2003; Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005); however, 
subsequent work on the topic has focussed on the use of Inverted Indexes (due to 
its ability to efficiently search an entire Document Collection, as opposed to specific 
Documents) (Curtmola et al., 2006; Van Liesdonk et al., 2010; Kamara et al., 2012; 
Cash et al., 2013). 
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Aside from SSE and PEKS, two other forms of encryption exist at present that 
support Searchable Encryption: Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) (Gentry, 
2009) and Oblivious RAM (ORAM) (Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1992).   
As mentioned previously, Fully-Homomorphic Encryption supports computations 
over data in encrypted form, including Searchable Encryption as it was originally 
envisioned by Song et al (2000); nonetheless efficient Fully-Homomorphic 
Encryption remains someway off (Gentry et al., 2015).   
Used in isolation, ORAM does not support Searchable Encryption.  Essentially, 
ORAM is a Client-Server communication protocol designed to obfuscate memory 
access patterns on the Server side of a given transaction.  In its simplest form, 
ORAM consists of two operations: The Client storing data on the Server; that is, 
writing, and the Client retrieving Data from the Server; that is, reading.  In an effort 
to obfuscate memory access patterns on the Server, each Write operation is also 
accompanied by an associated Read operation, and each Read operation is 
accompanies by an associated Write operation.  In addition, each Read/Write 
operation accesses numerous memory locations on the Server instead of just a 
single memory location (in an effort to further obfuscate memory access patterns; 
that is, false positives) (Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1992).  In the context of 
Searchable Encryption, ORAM is typically combined with SSE and PEKS Searchable 
Encryption schemes to improve their security.  SSE and PEKS Searchable Encryption 
schemes Leak Information to the Server a number of ways (see Section 2.3.1).  By 
combining such schemes with ORAM, such Information Leakage can be eradicated; 
nonetheless, the search efficiency of schemes utilising ORAM is severely hindered 
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due to the amount of work involved in obfuscating memory access patterns using 
ORAM (Stefanov et al., 2013; Hahn and Kerschbaum, 2014). 
In relation to search efficiency, both SSE and PEKS achieve optimal search time 
when used in conjunction with an Inverted Index; that is, search time is linear in the 
number of Documents matching the Search String; however in terms of security, SSE 
is vastly superior to PEKS (Bosch et al., 2014).  Given that PEKS is a form of Public 
Key encryption, an adversary can easily mount an attack on such a Searchable 
Encryption scheme given the associated Public Key and a dictionary of chosen 
Terms (Boneh et al., 2004).  In the case of SSE, all associated keys are kept private 
(Curtmola et al., 2006). 
As part of this dissertation, the author has chosen to focus on the topic of SSE using 
the Inverted Index.  The author’s decision to do so is due to the fact that SSE 
represents the most efficient form of Searchable Encryption (see Figure 1) at the 
time of writing4.  The author readily acknowledges that SSE is rather unorthodox in 
its working, particularly when compared to other Searchable Encryption solutions; 
nonetheless, SSE represents one of the few forms of Searchable Encryption that is 
achievable using established standardised encryption algorithms.  Alternative forms 
of Searchable Encryption require the use of non-standardised, special purpose 
encryption algorithms (Gentry, 2009).  As regards security, the author also 
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 September 14
th
 2015. 
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acknowledges that SSE is considered one of the least secure forms of Searchable 
Encryption (see Figure 1); primarily due to Information Leakage.  Solutions exist to 
eradicate and obfuscate all forms of Information Leakage in SSE; however existing 
solutions have a significant effect on the search efficiency of SSE (Stefanov et al., 
2013; Hahn and Kerschbaum, 2014).  Evidently, the challenge for researchers is to 
improve the security of SSE while maintaining its superior search efficiency. 
 
Figure 1: Efficiency Vs.  Security Trade-off For Various Searchable Encryption Schemes 
(Kamara, 2013). 
Figure 15 lists all known solutions to the problem of searching on encrypted data; 
that is, symmetrically encrypted data, as well as public key encrypted data.  The y-
axis of Figure 1 lists all Searchable Encryption solutions with respect to their 
efficiency, while the x-axis lists all solutions with respect to security.  As regards 
                                                     
 
5
 FEnc/IBE represent extensions of PEKS Searchable Encryption, while PPE/DET refers to Searchable 
Encryption schemes that utilise Symmetric Key Encryption or Public Key Encryption exclusively (SSE 
utilises a combination of Symmetric Key Encryption and Hash Functions; hence SSE being classified 
as a separate form of Searchable Encryption).   
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efficiency, the SSE literature defines efficiency as the time-complexity associated 
with finding a given Encrypted Search String (ESS) within a body of encrypted data 
(expressed in Big O Notation).  In terms of security, the SSE literature defines 
security as the amount of Information Leakage associated with using a given 
Searchable Encryption scheme; that is, what the Server learns (or can deduce) about 
the ciphertext by searching over it (expressed in Terms of the numerous categories 
of Information Leakage) (Kamara, 2013). 
1.3 Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 constitutes the Literature Review conducted as part of this dissertation.   
The Literature Review begins with a brief overview of the concept of Searchable 
Encryption (Section 2.1).  As part of this overview, the author identifies the major 
reasons why symmetrically encrypted ciphertext cannot be searched in the same 
manner as plaintext data, before briefly discussing Searchable Symmetric 
Encryption (SSE) – the solution to searching same.    
In its most basic form, SSE is nothing more than an Inverted Index – a mechanism 
that has been used in plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) for decades - that has 
been modified and adapted for use with ciphertext.   
To familiarise the reader with the concept and operation of an Inverted Index, 
Section 2.2 provides an in-depth discussion of the Inverted Index as used in 
plaintext IR.  This is followed by a discussion of the how the Inverted Index has been 
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adapted and modified for use with ciphertext; that is, SSE, in Section 2.3, as well as 
a brief discussion and critical analysis of two closed source implementations of SSE. 
At the conclusion of the Literature Review, the following Research Questions are 
identified: 
 RQ1: How Efficient Is Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) When 
Implemented And Deployed In A Cloud Environment? 
 RQ2: What Is The Performance Cost Of Preserving Data/Query Privacy Using 
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) When Compared To Plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR)? 
With a view to providing an answer to the aforementioned Research Questions, the 
author developed two software artefacts: ‘PlainTXT Stroage and Search Engine’ – an 
implementation of a plaintext IR System, and ‘CipherTXT Storage and Search 
Engine’ – an implementation of an SSE system. 
Chapter 3 outlines the Software Requirements Specification for both software 
artefacts produced as part of this dissertation; Chapter 4 outlines the Design details 
of same, while Chapter 5 outlines the Implementation details of same.   
Chapter 6 comprises the Test Results obtained from both software artefacts, while 
Chapter 7 constitutes an evaluation of both the software artefacts and their 
associated Test Results. 
Chapter 8 comprises the set of Conclusions derived from this dissertation, as well as 
areas of potential future Research.  
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2. Literature Review 
This Chapter introduces the concept of Searchable Encryption in the context of a 
Literature Review. 
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) has its roots in plaintext searching, although 
symmetrically encrypted ciphertext cannot be searched in the same manner; 
nonetheless, many of the principles that apply to plaintext searching also apply to 
SSE. 
In its most basic form, SSE is nothing more than an Inverted Index – a mechanism 
that has been used in plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) for decades - that has 
been modified and adapted for use with ciphertext.   
Initial discussions of the Inverted Index centre on an explanation of its application 
to plaintext Information Retrieval.  This is followed by a discussion of the how the 
Inverted Index has been adapted and modified for use with ciphertext.   
Consider the following example application in the context of plaintext:  
A Client has outsourced storage of a Document Collection to a Server.  Should the 
Client wish to retrieve those Documents from the Server that contain a specific 
Search String, the Client simply forwards the Search String in question to the Server.  
In turn, the Server processes the Search String against the Document Collection and 
responds to the Client with those Documents that contain the specified Search 
String; that is, Search Results.   
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2.1 Searchable Encryption: An Overview 
Fifteen years ago, Song et al.  (2000) first proposed the concept of Searchable 
Encryption.  When explaining the basic operation of Searchable Encryption, Song et 
al. (2000) did so using an example whereby the content of symmetrically encrypted 
Documents were sequentially searched; that is, character-by-character, word-by-
word, for the presence of a user specified Search String.  Prior to the Search taking 
place, the Search String specified by the user was first encrypted using the same key 
used to encrypt the Documents being searched, with the resulting value – referred 
to as the Encrypted Search String (ESS) – being the value Searched for within the 
encrypted Documents.  Those encrypted Documents deemed to contain the ESS 
were then returned to the user as part of the subsequent Search Results (see Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2: Original Description of Searchable Encryption 
 
While this explanation successfully communicated the basic premise of Searchable 
Encryption – in a manner relatively similar to plaintext Information Retrieval (IR); 
that is, plaintext searching - it nonetheless ignored the fact that modern symmetric 
ciphers do not support Searchable Encryption as described by Song et al.  (2000).  
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Specifically, modern symmetric ciphers implement Shannon’s Confusion and 
Diffusion principles (through the use of Substitution-Permutation networks) to 
counter cryptanalysis (Stallings, 2014, p.66-67).  As a consequence, Searchable 
Encryption - as described by Song et al. (2000) - is not feasible6. 
The description of Searchable Encryption provided by Song et al. (2000) operates on 
the assumption that a given Term - whether in plaintext form or encrypted form - is 
located in the same position in both the plaintext version of the Document and the 
encrypted version of the same Document.  For Example:  Given a plaintext 
Document beginning with the Term ‘The’, the description provided by Song et al.  
(2000) assumes that the first three characters of both the plaintext version of the 
Document and the encrypted version of the Document correspond to the Term ‘The’.  
Essentially this description assumes that symmetric ciphers encrypt data one 
character at a time, when in reality, this is not the case. 
                                                     
 
6
 In their paper, Song et al. (2000) demonstrate that Searchable Encryption can in fact be achieved as 
originally described; albeit only in the case of a single highly unsecure scenario.  The scenario in 
question requires that data be encrypted using Electronic Code Book mode (the use of ECB mode is 
highly discouraged due to its susceptibility to cryptanalysis) and that the author of the Document 
being searched limit the maximum length of plaintext Terms in the Document to the Block Size of 
the associated cipher (8 characters in the case of DES, 16 characters in the case of AES).  In addition, 
the scenario also requires that the author of the Documents ensure that only a single Term is 
contained within each ciphertext Block.   
 
For Example, consider a Document due to be encrypted using AES (16 byte Block Size).  Should the 
Document in question begin with the word ‘The’ (3 characters), the author of the Document would 
have to ensure that 13 whitespaces appeared after the word ‘The’ in order to ensure that only a 
single Term was contained within the first ciphertext block within the Document (16 characters in 
total). 
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Modern symmetric ciphers encrypt data in blocks of a fixed size, rather than 
character by character (Stallings, 2014, p.62).  The effect of using such ciphers is 
that the ciphertext associated with a given plaintext Term is spread across the 
entire ciphertext block, rather than appearing in the same position as the plaintext 
Term; thus preventing traditional Sequential Searching (Stallings, 2014, p.63).  In 
addition, modern symmetric ciphers typically operate using advanced block cipher 
modes (another mechanism to counter cryptanalysis) which ‘chain’ the ciphertext 
of previously encrypted blocks to the current plaintext block (by means of a bitwise 
XOR operation) (Stallings, 2014, p.183-198); thus further complicating the problem 
of searching ciphertext for the presence of an encrypted version of a plaintext 
Search String6. 
Recognising the inherent difficulty in achieving Searchable Encryption as originally 
described by Song et al. (2000), subsequent work in the area focussed on 
developing solutions to the problem as originally conceived; albeit without actually 
using Sequential Searching (Goh, 2003).  Specifically, researchers focussed on 
adapting the Inverted Index – a mechanism that has been used in plaintext 
Information Retrieval for decades – for use in Searchable Encryption (Curtmola et 
al., 2006).   
In its most basic form, an Inverted Index is a Data Structure that maps Terms to the 
Document(s) they occur in; therefore eradicating the need to Sequentially Search 
Documents (Luenberger, 2006, p.285; Manning et al., 2008, p.6).  When adapted 
for use with an encrypted Document Collection, the resulting Inverted Index is titled 
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Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) (Curtmola et al., 2006)- the topic of focus 
for this dissertation. 
2.2 Information Retrieval and the Inverted Index 
Unlike searching a Collection of encrypted Documents, searching a Collection of 
plaintext Documents for the presence of a user specified Search String is a trivial 
process.   
The most basic method of doing so, known as Sequential Searching, involves 
examining each Document within a Collection on a Term by Term basis.  As each 
Term within the Document being examined is encountered, the Term in question is 
simply compared to the user specified Search String for equality (assuming the 
Search String in question consists of a single Term).  In the event that a Document 
Term matches the user specified Search String, the associated Document is then 
returned to the user as part of the ensuing Search Results (Manning et al., 2008, 
p.3). 
While Sequential Searching functions effectively, its search efficiency is poor:  
Sequential Searching suffers from the fact that each Document in the Collection 
must be examined; therefore making its search time linear in the number of 
Documents contained within the Collection.  As such, the time taken to search the 
Collection increases as the number of Documents in the Collection expands. 
The poor performance of Sequential Searching can be directly attributed to the fact 
that the set of Terms contained within each Document must be determined at run 
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time; that is, while the Search is being conducted.  In addition, the set of Documents 
that a Search String occurs in must also be determined at run-time; hence why each 
Document within the Collection must be examined (Manning et al., 2008, p.3-4). 
In an effort to expedite the process of plaintext Information Retrieval (IR), the 
Inverted Index was developed.  Just like a Database Index is designed to speed up 
data retrieval without searching each row of a Database Table, the Inverted Index is 
designed to speed up IR without having to search each Document within a 
Collection. 
In its most basic form, an Inverted Index is a Data Structure that maps each Term 
within a Collection to the Document(s) it occurs in (Luenberger, 2006, p.6). 
The Inverted Index attempts to overcome the shortcomings of Sequential Searching 
by pre-computing the list of all Terms contained within a Document Collection, as 
well as each pre-computing what Document(s) each Term occurs in; that is, in 
advance of a search occurring.  The purpose of pre-computing this list of Terms – 
commonly referred to as the Lexicon of the Collection – is that the list of Terms is 
searched for the presence of the user specified Search String, instead of the 
Document Collection; thus making the search time linear in the number of Terms 
contained within the Collection.   
For improved search efficiency, it is common for the Lexicon to be stored using Data 
Structures that expedite searching, such as Hash Tables (O(1) Search Complexity), 
Binary Search Trees (O(Log N) Search Complexity), B-Trees (O(Log N) Search 
Complexity) or Word Tries (O(Log N) Search Complexity). 
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Section 2.2.1 outlines how the Inverted Index is constructed for usage in plaintext 
IR, while Section 2.2.2 outlines how same is queried.   
2.2.1 Inverted Index Construction 
Construction of an Inverted Index first requires a Document Collection from which 
the Inverted Index will be built; that is, the Document Collection to be searched.  
Inverted Index construction begins with each Document within the Collection being 
sequentially scanned by the Server7, and a note being made of each Term that 
occurs within each Document.  This process is typically referred to as Document 
Tokenisation (Manning et al., 2008, p.22)).   
Each and every Term encountered during Document Tokenisation is added to a list 
known as the Lexicon (see Figure 3).  Essentially, the Lexicon is the list of all Terms 
that occur in a given Document Collection (Luenberger, 2006, p.285; Manning et al., 
2008, p.6).  In the event of the same Term occurring multiple times in a single 
Document, or the same Term occurring in multiple Documents within the 
Collection– both of which are inevitable - the Term in question appears only once in 
the Lexicon; therefore, each Term contained within the Lexicon is unique 
(Luenberger, 2006, p.286-287; Manning et al., 2008, p.22).   
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 In SSE, the Client is responsible for constructing the Inverted Index; not the Server as is the case 
with plaintext Information Retrieval (IR). 
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Figure 3: Sample Lexicon. 
 
Throughout the process of Document Tokenisation, each and every Document that 
a given Term occurs in is also noted; that is, the Document ID is noted8 (see Figure 
4).  The noting of a given Term occurring in a given Document is referred to as a 
Posting, while the list of all Documents; that is,  Document ID’s, where a given Term 
occurs is referred to as a Posting List (Manning et al., 2008, p.6). 
 
Figure 4: Sample Lexicon (Including Postings/Posting Lists). 
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 As part of the process of Inverted Index Construction, each Document within the Collection is 
assigned a unique identifier known as a Document ID. 
38 
 
 
Figure 5: Tabular Visualisation of an Inverted Index (Luenberger, 2006, p.287). 
 
Figure 5  depicts a simple tabular visualisation of an Inverted Index.  The Lexicon for 
the Document Collection is listed in the left most column of the table, while the list 
of Documents within the Collection; that is, Documents IDs is listed along the top 
row of the table.  The intersection of each row and column contains a value 
denoting whether or not the Term associated with the row in question occurs 
within the Document associated with the column in question, with ‘1’ denoting the 
occurrence of the Term within the Document; that is,  a Posting, and ‘0’ denoting 
the absence of the Term from the Document9 (Luenberger, 2006, p.285-286; 
Manning et al., 2008, p.3-4).   
  
                                                     
 
9
 In reality, a fully functioning IR System would only record the occurrence of a Term within a 
Document, and not the non-occurrence of a Term (doing so would be hugely wasteful in terms of 
memory).  The inclusion of non-occurrence information in the table in Figure 5 is merely for 
explanatory purposes. 
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Regarding implementation details, an Inverted Index can be implemented in a 
number of ways: 
 As mentioned previously, the Lexicon can be implemented and stored using 
a number of different Data Structures.  This dissertation assumes that the 
Data Structure used is a Hash Table (due to its efficiency; that is, O(1)). 
 Due to their list-like nature, Posting Lists are typically implemented using a 
Linked List Data Structure.  Alternative Data Structures, such as Arrays, can 
be used; however the dynamic nature of Posting Lists often makes the 
Linked List Data Structure the preferred choice. 
 In relation to Document storage, Documents can be stored in a number of 
ways.  Primarily, Documents are either stored using the native file system of 
the Server they are stored on, or alternatively, as Rows within a Database 
Table (with their designated Document ID acting as their Primary Key value). 
In term of memory management, the Lexicon of an Inverted Index is typically 
loaded into Random Access Memory (RAM) at all times.  Given that the Lexicon 
contains the information to be searched whenever an Inverted Index is queried; it is 
therefore common that a significant amount of RAM be allocated to same. 
Regarding memory management for Posting Lists and Documents, both sets of 
information are typically stored in secondary memory.  This is due to the fact that 
both Posting Lists and Documents are only ever retrieved whenever their 
associated Terms are searched for. 
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For improved performance, it is common for the first Link of a Postings List Linked 
List to be stored alongside its associated Term in the Lexicon Data Structure; that is, 
in RAM.  This is due to the fact that the first Link in a Linked List is required to 
access all subsequent Links in the Linked List; that is,  all subsequent Postings 
(stored in secondary memory) (Luenberger, 2006, p.289; Manning et al., 2008, p.7).   
Figure 6 provides a simple visualisation of the Inverted Index as typically utilised in 
plaintext Information Retrieval (IR).  Incorporated within the Figure is the Data 
Structures commonly used to store the three data sets that make up the Inverted 
Index, as well as what form of computer memory is typically used to store each 
Data Structure. 
  
 
 
Figure 6: Inverted Index Visualisation (Including Data Structures and Memory Management).
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2.2.2 Querying an Inverted Index 
Performing a Query against the Inverted Index structure described in Section 2.2.1 
is relatively simple.   
Given a Search String, the Lexicon Data Structure is examined to determine the 
presence or absence of the Search String within the Lexicon.   
In the event that the Search String is present in the Lexicon, the first Posting 
associated with the matching Term is retrieved from RAM.  In turn, this Link is then 
used to retrieve all subsequent Links in the Linked List (stored in secondary 
memory); thus retrieving all Postings for the Search String in question.  Once the 
Posting List has been retrieved in full, the associated Document IDs are then used to 
retrieve the actual Documents – from secondary memory – that contain the Search 
String.  Once all Documents are retrieved, they are then forwarded to the Client; 
that is, Search Results. 
In the event that a Search String is not present in the Lexicon, this denotes that the 
Search String in question is not present in any Documents contained within the 
Collection (Luenberger, 2006, p.293; Manning et al., 2008, p.10).   
  
 43 
 
2.3 Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) 
To ensure clarity, the author refers to the Inverted Index structure used in plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR) as the IR Inverted Index, while its SSE counterpart is 
referred to as the SSE Inverted Index. 
As the name suggests, the SSE Inverted Index borrows heavily from the IR Inverted 
Index.  All information presented previously in relation to the IR Inverted Index 
remains true for the SSE Inverted Index; however the reader should be aware that 
SSE and the SSE Inverted Index differ from IR and the IR Inverted Index in the 
following ways: 
The topic of Information Leakage forms an Integral part of SSE.  When the idea of 
Searchable Encryption was first proposed, one of its founding principles was the 
assumption that the Server storing the encrypted Document Collection is an 
adversary that is actively working on subverting the security of the Document 
Collection it possesses (with the ultimate goal of gaining access to the Document 
Collection in plaintext form) (Song et al., 2000).  As such, the SSE Inverted Index is 
constructed and operates in a manner that takes significant steps to reduce the 
Leakage of potentially useful Information to the Server.  In practice, this involves 
the use of encryption for the Document Collection, the Lexicon, Posting Lists and 
Search Strings; as well as the use of Data Structures that hinder the Servers efforts 
in achieving its malicious goals (Goh, 2003; Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005; 
Curtmola et al., 2006). 
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Responsibility for creating the SSE Inverted Index is offloaded to the Client.  In order 
for the Server to construct the SSE Inverted Index, decryption keys must be 
disclosed to the Server (as mentioned previously, this is undesirable from a data 
security perspective).  Rather than reveal sensitive information to the Server, SSE 
delegates responsibility of constructing the SSE Inverted Index to the Client.  Given 
that the Client is responsible for constructing the SSE Inverted Index, it is therefore 
expected that the Client forwards the SSE Inverted Index to the Server along with 
the encrypted Document Collection whenever the latter is forwarded to the Server 
for storage (Goh, 2003).   
Subsection 2.3.2 provides an overview of how the SSE Inverted Index is constructed, 
while Subsection 2.3.3 provides an overview of how same is queried10.  Prior to the 
discussing both, a brief overview of Information Leakage is first given in Subsection 
2.3.1. 
2.3.1 Information Leakage 
2.3.1.1 A Basic Overview 
A significant portion of the Searchable Encryption literature has focussed on 
determining what Information Leakage results from a) The Server being in 
                                                     
 
10
 The SSE scheme discussed throughout this dissertation is that presented in Kamara et al. (2012), 
with the exception that support for updates to the Document Collection and the associated SSE 
Inverted Index are not included in this dissertation. 
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possession of the encrypted Document Collection, and b) The Server carrying out 
searches on same; that is, a Client ordering the Server to perform a Search, or the 
Server itself carrying out searches covertly.  The purpose of studying such 
Information Leakage is to determine whether or not any and all Information Leaked 
by various Searchable Encryption schemes is useful to the Server in terms of 
achieving its malicious goal(s)11.    
Ideally, no Information Leakage should occur as a result of utilising Searchable 
Encryption; however, like all ideal scenarios, realising it is not without its 
challenges.  The two most secure forms of Searchable Encryption at present; that is, 
Oblivious RAM (RAM) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption-2 (FHE-2) (see Figure 1), 
achieve zero Information Leakage; however both do so at the expense of efficiency.  
In both solutions, this poor efficiency can be directly attributed to the Information 
Leakage countermeasures utilised (Chunsheng, 2011; Stefanov et al., 2013; Hahn 
and Kerschbaum, 2014). 
In an effort to improve the overall efficiency of Searchable Encryption, several 
researchers have examined the prospect of relaxing the zero-tolerance approach to 
Information Leakage in Searchable Encryption (Goh, 2003; Chang and 
Mitzenmacher, 2005; Curtmola et al., 2006; Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013).  
Specifically, researchers have attempted to determine what Information Leakage is 
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 All SSE schemes – with the exception of Song et al. (2000) – included full discussions of 
Information Leakage, as well as full Proofs of Security (Bosch, 2014). 
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acceptable in Searchable Encryption (sometimes referred to as Trivial Information 
Leakage); that is, Information that in no ways aids the Server in achieving its goal of 
subverting the encrypted Document Collection.  Evidently, the goal of this Research 
was to identify which Information Leakage countermeasures are absolutely 
necessary in Searchable Encryption; therefore allowing researchers to focus on 
creating search efficient schemes that conform to this baseline measure of 
Information Leakage (at a minimum) . 
2.3.1.2 Information Leakage in Searchable Symmetric Encryption  
In the case of Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE), it is the SSE Inverted Index 
that is searched by the Server, instead of the encrypted Document Collection.  As 
such, the SSE literature instead focusses on determining what Information Leakage 
results from the Server being in possession of the SSE Inverted Index, as well as 
what Information Leakage results from the Client (or the Server itself) querying 
same. 
In terms of Information Leakage in SSE, such Information Leakage is typically broken 
into three categories: Storage Leakage; that is, what the Server can learn (or 
deduce) from the SSE Inverted Index by simply storing it (that is, without the SSE 
Inverted Index actually being queried), Query Leakage; that is, what the Server can 
learn (or deduce) from the SSE Inverted Index by querying it itself (covertly) , or 
observing the SSE Inverted Index being queried by Client(s), and Update Leakage; 
that is, what the Server can learn (or deduce) whenever the SSE Inverted Index is 
updated (such as when Documents within the Collection are edited/deleted, or 
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when new Documents are added to the Collection) (Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and 
Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 2012; Kamara, 2013). 
As part of this dissertation, the author has attempted to produce an all-
encompassing list of Information that can potentially be Leaked by SSE, as well as 
highlighting what Information Leakage is classified as Trivial and Non-Trivial by the 
Searchable Encryption literature (Curtmola et al. 2006, Cash et al. 2013).  Figure 7 
presents potential Storage Leakage by an SSE scheme (including an indication of 
whether or not such Information is classified as Trivial Information Leakage or Non-
Trivial Information Leakage), while Figure 8 presents potential Query Leakage by an 
SSE scheme.   
Note that potential Storage Leakage is presented in terms of the three inter-related 
data sets that make up an SSE Inverted Index; that is, the Lexicon, Postings and the 
associated encrypted Document Collection, while potential Query Leakage is 
presented in terms of the Search Pattern; that is, the Encrypted Search String (ESS) 
received by the Server (and whether or not the ESS was utilised before), and the 
Access Pattern; that is, those encrypted Document(s) deemed to contain the ESS, 
their associated memory location(s) and their Document ID(s). 
In the description of SSE that follows in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3, all 
Information classified as Non-Trivial in Figure 7 (Potential Storage Leakage) and 
Figure 8 (Potential Query Leakage) is Leaked to the Server. 
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Figure 7: Potential Storage Leakage in SSE (Including Trivial Leakage and Non-Trivial 
Leakage). 
 
 
Figure 8: Potential Query Leakage in SSE (Including Trivial Leakage and Non-Trivial 
Leakage). 
 
From examining Figure 7 and Figure 8, it is evident that Leaking Information to the 
Server in ciphertext form is considered Trivial Information Leakage by the SSE 
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Literature – irrespective of whether such ciphertext is Leaked to the Server as part 
of Setup Leakage or Query Leakage. 
As regards plaintext Information Leakage, such Leakage is generally considered 
Non-Trivial Information Leakage by the SSE Literature; however, a notable 
exception to this rule is Document IDs.  From Figure 7 (Postings Section), it is 
noticeable that the Leakage of Document IDs in plaintext form is considered Non-
Trivial Information Leakage in the case of Setup Leakage; while the exact same 
Information is classified as Trivial Information Leakage in the case of Query Leakage 
(Figure 8 – Access Pattern). 
In addition to considering Information Leakage in the context of plaintext 
Information and ciphertext Information, the literature also considers Information 
Leakage from a statistical point of view; that is, those statistics that be derived from 
Information, irrespective of whether the underlying Information is in plaintext form 
or ciphertext form.   
Generally, the SSE literature classifies statistical Information Leakage as Trivial 
Information Leakage; however one exception does exist.  The statistic in question – 
known as Term-Document Frequency (TDF); that is, the number of Documents 
containing a given Term - is classified as Non-Trivial Information Leakage in the case 
of Setup Leakage (see Postings in Figure 7); and Trivial Information Leakage in the 
case of Query Leakage (see Access Pattern in Figure 8) (much like Document IDs as 
discussed previously). 
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Admittedly, the decision to label certain Information Leakage as Non-Trivial for 
Setup Leakage and the decision to label the exact same Information Leakage as 
Trivial for Query Leakage appears bewildering.  Nonetheless, this can be explained 
by the conservative approach to Information Leakage taken by researchers in the 
area.  Generally, where certain Information Leakage is considered unavoidable (and 
the Information in question is classified as Trivial Information Leakage), researchers 
take the approach of allowing such information to be Leaked; however, rather than 
Leak such Information immediately; that is,  Storage Leakage, researchers will 
typically guard such Information up to the point where its Leakage is absolutely 
necessary and therefore unavoidable (otherwise known as Controlled Disclosure); 
that is,  Query Leakage (Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Cash et al., 
2013). 
2.3.1.3 Security Definitions 
A number of security definitions have been proposed for Searchable Encryption, the 
most prevalent of which is IND-CKA2 (Indistinguishable Against Adaptive Chosen 
Keyword Attacks) (Curtmola et al., 2006; Bosch et al., 2014).   
Essentially, IND-CKA2 security requires that an adversary (in this case, the Server) 
learn nothing about the underlying Document Collection/SSE Inverted Index beyond 
the Search String - in ciphertext form - and the associated Search Results - in 
ciphertext form; that is, Trivial Information Leakage, even when the SSE scheme 
can be adaptively queried by the Server.  Numerous SSE schemes have been 
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developed that adhere to the IND-CKA2 notion of security (including the SSE 
discussed in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3) 
Stronger definitions of Security do exist in the literature (Shen et al., 2008); 
however such schemes are typically inefficient due to their refusal to allow 
Information Leakage in any form (Shen et al., 2008; Bosch et al., 2012). 
2.3.2 SSE Inverted Index Construction 
The steps involved in constructing an SSE Inverted Index are exactly the same as 
those involved in constructing an IR Inverted Index, albeit the Client has 
responsibility for generating the SSE Inverted Index, and various forms of 
encryption are applied to each dataset after they have been compiled; that is, the 
Document Collection, the Lexicon and the Postings List (Goh, 2003).   
In addition to the use of encryption, a different Data Structure – namely, an Array - 
is utilised to store Postings instead of a Linked List (as is used in the IR Inverted 
Index) (Curtmola et al., 2006). 
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2.3.2.1 Lexicon 
Rather than storing Lexicon Terms in plaintext form, SSE requires that a keyed-
hash12 of each Term be stored instead (Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 
2012).   
The use of a keyed hash function for this purpose - instead of traditional reversible 
encryption - may seem curious at first; however researchers have successfully 
argued that the Lexicon’s sole purpose within the Inverted Index is to provide the 
Client with the ability to carry out searches and nothing more.  Given that the 
Lexicon is unlikely to be downloaded to the Client (and is therefore unlikely to be 
decrypted - unlike the actual Documents), the use of reversible encryption for 
encrypting Lexicon Terms has largely been abandoned (Chase and Kamara, 2010; 
Kamara et al., 2012).   
  
                                                     
 
12
 The use of a Keyed Hash function for this purpose implicitly limits the number of Lexicon Terms to 
the maximum number of unique Hash Values produced by the associated Hash function.  Should the 
number of Lexicon Terms exceed the maximum number of Hash Values, a Hash Collision will most 
definitely occur (and may even occur before this point is reached), leading to a scenario whereby 
two distinct plaintext Lexicon Terms have the same Hash Value; therefore leaving the Server unable 
to distinguish which Lexicon Term is being searched for.  While Hash Collisions are unlikely for small 
data sets, they remain a distinct possibility for large data sets.  
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Aside from the aforementioned reasons, the use of a keyed hash function for this 
purpose has a number of advantages in terms of reduced Information Leakage and 
improved data security, including the following (Stallings, 2014, p.368-372): 
 First and foremost, the use of a hash function (keyed or non-keyed) ensures 
that all encrypted Lexicon Terms within the SSE Inverted Index are of equal 
length (a hash function produces a Hexadecimal String of fixed length); 
therefore masking the length of all underlying plaintext Lexicon Terms.   
 Secondly, the use of a hash function (again, keyed or non-keyed) ensures 
that an adversary has no means of decrypting the encrypted Lexicon Term 
back to its plaintext form.   
 Thirdly, ensuring that a keyed hash function is used – instead of a traditional 
non-keyed hash function – protects SSE from Rainbow Table Attacks; that is, 
pre-computed Hash Values of common Dictionary Words. 
As regards keyed-hash algorithms, the SSE literature states that any standardised 
secure algorithm can be utilised for Lexicon Encryption (For Example: HMAC-MD5, 
HMAC-SHA256) (Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013).  
2.3.2.2 Postings List 
The use of Linked Lists for Posting List storage is abandoned in SSE due to Setup 
Leakage resulting from their modus operandi; that is, sequential memory access, 
with Arrays being preferred instead (Curtmola et al., 2006). 
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Specifically, given the first Link in a Linked List, it is a trivial process to examine all 
subsequent Links due to the fact that each Link in a Linked List contains a pointer to 
the next Link (see Figure 9).  Given that each Term in an IR Inverted Index has its 
own dedicated Linked List to store Postings; it is therefore a trivial process to derive 
the Term-Document Frequency (TDF) for each Term in the Lexicon in advance of the 
associated Term being searched for (Recall from Subsection 2.3.1.2 that TDF 
Leakage is considered Non-Trivial Information Leakage for Storage Leakage) 
(Luenberger, 2006, p.243; Chase and Kamara, 2010).  
 
Figure 9: Linked List Data Structure (→ Denotes A Pointer to the Next Link in the Linked 
List). 
 
Rather than using one Array for each Term in the Lexicon (doing so would also 
result in TDF Storage Leakage; that is, the size of the Array would be equivalent to 
the TDF), SSE utilises a single one dimensional Array to store all Postings for all 
Terms (see Figure 10).  Utilising this approach, Setup Leakage amounts to the total 
number of Postings for the entire Lexicon; that is, trivial Leakage. 
 
Figure 10: Postings Stored In an Array. 
 
Given that all Postings are now stored in a single one dimensional Array, some 
mechanism to keep track of what Postings belong to what Terms is therefore 
required.  The solution to this problem is –ironically enough – relatively similar to a 
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Linked List, albeit the solution involved does not utilise pointers (as is the case with 
Linked Lists). 
In order to keep track of what Postings are associated with a given Term, SSE 
requires that the Document ID of the first Posting associated with a given Term is 
stored alongside the keyed-hash of the Term in the Lexicon Hash Table (in RAM) 
(For Example: Doc ID 1).  Alongside this Document ID (in the Lexicon Hash Table) is 
an Array Index denoting the location of the second Posting associated with the 
Term (see Figure 11) (For Example: 94).  At the Array Index in question is the 
Document ID of the 2nd Posting, as well as the Array Index denoting the location of 
the third Posting (For Example: 79) (see Figure 12) 13.   
 
Figure 11: SSE Lexicon Node. 
 
 
Figure 12: Postings Array Node. 
 
Rather than storing all Postings sequentially within the Array, SSE requires that all 
Postings be shuffled to random locations within the Postings Array.  As such, the 
                                                     
 
13
 Essentially, the first Posting is stored alongside its associated Term in RAM, with all other 
subsequent Postings being stored in the Postings Array.  Alongside each Posting is the Array Index 
denoting the location of the next Posting. 
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second Posting for a Term may be located at Array Index 1000, while the third 
Posting may be located at Array Index 1. 
Despite utilising Arrays and arranging Postings in non-sequential order, the fact 
remains that the Information stored at each Index of the Postings Array is in 
plaintext form.  As such, it is still a trivial process for the Server to calculate the TDF 
for each Term in the Lexicon in advance of the Term being searched for (as was the 
case previously with Linked Lists).   
As a solution to this problem, SSE requires that each Document ID within the 
Postings Array be encrypted, as well as each ‘Next Posting Location’; therefore 
preventing the Server from deducing this Information by merely being in possession 
of the SSE Inverted Index; that is, Storage Leakage.   
Rather than encrypting all Postings using the same key, SSE requires that each 
Posting be encrypted using a different key.  In an effort to reduce the number of 
keys the Client has to remember in order to utilise SSE, the literature recommends 
the following guidelines for encrypting the Posting Array: 
1. The encryption/decryption key for the first Posting associated with each 
Term should be derived by passing its associated plaintext Term through a 
keyed hash function (the key utilised within the keyed hash function is a 
master key known only to the Client). 
2. All subsequent Postings in the Array; that is, 2nd Posting, 3rd Posting, 4th 
Posting, etc., are to be encrypted/decrypted using randomly generated 
encryption keys. 
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3. The key required to decrypt a given Posting (with the exception of the first 
Posting) is to be stored in the previous Posting associated with the Term in 
question (see Figure 13)14. 
 
Figure 13: Postings Array Node (Including Decryption Key Storage). 
 
As regards encryption algorithms, the SSE literature states that any standardised 
secure symmetric algorithm can be utilised for Posting/Posting List Encryption (For 
Example: AES, Triple DES) (Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara 
et al., 2012; Cash et al, 2013). 
                                                     
 
14
 The decision to store Posting decryption keys on the Server side may seem obscure at first 
however the reader should recall that all Postings associated with a given Lexicon Term are ‘chained 
together’ throughout the Postings Array.   
 
The first Posting in a Posting List is encrypted using a key generated by the Client, i.e. Posting List 
Encryption - Step 1.  Whenever the Client searches for the associated Lexicon Term, the Client must 
also forward the key necessary to decrypt the first Posting, i.e. Posting List Encryption - Step 1.  
Decrypting the first Posting then reveals the key necessary to decrypt the following Posting, i.e. 
Posting List Encryption – Step 2 and Step 3.  Without knowledge of the key required to decrypt the 
first Posting associated with a given Lexicon Term (Step 1), the Server is unable to decrypt 
subsequent Postings associated with the same Lexicon Term (Step 2 and Step 3).  
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2.3.2.3 Documents 
As regards encryption algorithms, the SSE literature states that any standardised 
secure symmetric algorithm can be utilised for Document Encryption (For Example: 
AES, Triple DES) (Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 
2012; Cash et al., 2013). 
2.3.2.4 Key Management 
SSE requires the use of three encryption keys for SSE Inverted Index Construction 
and Querying.  They are: 
 One key for Lexicon Encryption/Searching (used to generate a keyed hash of 
each Lexicon Term/Search String) 
 One master key used to derive encryption/decryption keys for the first 
Posting associated with each Lexicon Term. 
 One key for Document Collection encryption/decryption (Curtmola et al., 
2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013).   
2.3.3 Querying an SSE Inverted Index 
There are two types of SSE Schemes: Interactive; that is, the Client and the Server 
exchange numerous messages before the Server responds with a set of Search 
Results, and non-Interactive; that is, the Client issues a Search String to the Server 
and the Server responds immediately with a set of Search Results (Bosch et al., 
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2014).  The following description of querying an SSE Inverted Index covers the 
latter. 
Given that the Lexicon of the SSE Inverted Index consists of a keyed-hash of each 
Term within the Document Collection, the Client is therefore required to generate a 
keyed-hash of their Search String in order to Query the Lexicon.  The resulting 
Search String; that is, an Encrypted Search String (ESS), is then forwarded to the 
Server (Chase and Kamara, 2010; Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013).  In addition 
to forwarding the ESS to the Server, the Client must also forward the decryption key 
necessary to decrypt the first Posting associated with the ESS (Curtmola et al., 2006; 
Kamara et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013).  
In the event that the ESS is present in the Lexicon, the first Posting associated with 
the ESS is retrieved.  The Server then proceeds to decrypt this information revealing 
the ID of the first Document containing the ESS, the Index Location of the second 
Posting, as well as the decryption key necessary to decrypt the information stored 
in the second Posting.  This process then repeats until all Postings associated with 
the ESS have been retrieved and decrypted.  Following this, the associated 
Document IDs are then used to retrieve the actual encrypted Documents – from 
secondary memory – that contain the ESS (Curtmola et al., 2006; Kamara et al., 
2012; Cash et al., 2013).  Once all Documents are retrieved, they are then 
forwarded to the Client; that is, Search Results (Song et al., 2000). 
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In the event that an ESS is not present in the Lexicon, this denotes that the ESS in 
question is not present in any Documents contained within the Collection 
(Luenberger, 2006, p.293; Manning et al., 2008, p.10). 
2.3.4 Implementations of SSE 
Despite its efficiency, the fact remains that working implementations of SSE are few 
and far between.  As part of this Literature Review, the author encountered a total 
of two papers discussing working implementations of SSE (Kamara et al., 2012; Cash 
et al., 2013); neither of which are available in the public domain. 
Section 2.3.4.1 discusses the implementation of SSE developed by Kamara et al. 
(2012), while Section 2.3.4.2 discusses the implementation of SSE developed by 
Cash et al. (2013).  This is followed by a critical analysis of both implementations in 
Section 2.3.4.3. 
2.3.4.1 Kamara et al. (2012) Implementation 
The implementation of SSE developed by Kamara et al. (2012) is a non-interactive, 
single Query Term SSE protocol.  When compared to the description of SSE 
provided previously, the implementation by Kamara et al. (2012) is almost identical 
with the exception of the following: 
 The implementation supports the addition and deletion of documents from 
the Document Collection (and therefore the SSE Inverted Index) – The 
description of SSE previously assumed that the underlying Document 
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Collection was static (updates to the SSE Inverted Index were not discussed 
as they were deemed beyond the scope of this dissertation). 
 The implementation stores the entire Inverted Index; that is, Lexicon and 
Posting Lists, in RAM at all times. 
In terms of programming languages, the implementation of SSE by Kamara et al. 
(2012) was developed using Microsoft C++.NET.  Any and all cryptographic 
functionality associated with implementation employed the use of the Microsoft 
CNG library of cryptographic algorithms. 
In relation to Data Structures, the exact Data Structure used for Lexicon Storage is 
not disclosed by Kamara et al. (2012).  In the theoretical description of their 
scheme, Kamara et al. (2012) endorse the use of a ‘Dictionary’ Data Structure for 
Lexicon Storage; however the exact Data Structure used in the resulting 
implementation is not disclosed.  Given that a number of Data Structures fall under 
the category of Dictionary Data Structures15, the author can only speculate as to the 
exact Data Structure used.  In terms of Posting List storage, Kamara et al. (2012) 
employ the use of a single one dimensional ‘Array’ Data Structure (as was the case 
with the description of SSE provided previously).  
In terms of algorithms, the SSE implementation by Kamara et al. (2012) utilises 128 
bit AES-CBC for Posting encryption, while HMAC-SHA256 is used for keyed hashing 
                                                     
 
15
 A Hash Tree Data Structure is classified as a Dictionary Data Structure. 
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of Lexicon Terms.  The exact algorithm used for Document encryption is not 
disclosed. 
In relation to Test Data, Kamara et al. (2012) tested their SSE implementation 
against three separate Test Data Sets: a subset of the Enron E-Mail Collection 
(16MB in size with approximately 1.5 million Postings), a collection of Microsoft 
Office Documents used by one of Microsoft’s Business Groups (500MB in size with 
approximately 650,000 Postings), and a collection of Media Files (For Example: 
MP3, WMA, JPG) (500MB in size – number of postings not disclosed). 
In terms of Research Results, the work of Kamara et al. (2012) focussed on two 
separate aspects of SSE:  constructing the SSE Inverted Index, and querying the SSE 
Inverted Index.   
For SSE Inverted Index construction, it should be noted that the Results presented 
by Kamara et al. (2012) only take into account the process of converting a pre-
existing IR Inverted Index into an SSE Inverted Index and encrypting the associated 
Document Collection – the Results do not include the amount of time taken to 
generate the initial IR Inverted Index; nor do they take into account the time 
associated with transferring the SSE Inverted Index and the encrypted Document 
Collection from the Client to the Server. For the Enron E-Mail Test Data Set, 
constructing the associated SSE Inverted Index and encrypting the associated 
Document Collection took 52 seconds.  For the Microsoft Office Document 
Collection Test Data Set, constructing the associated SSE Inverted Index and 
encrypting the associated Document Collection took approximately 33 seconds. 
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For SSE Inverted Index searching, it should be noted that the Results presented by 
Kamara et al. (2012) only take into account the process of retrieving and decrypting 
matching Postings from within an SSE Inverted Index that is permanently resident in 
RAM16– the Results do not include the amount of time taken to retrieve the SSE 
Inverted Index from secondary memory and loading it into RAM, nor do they 
include the amount of time taken to retrieve matching Documents from disk and 
returning them to the Client.  In relation to SSE search time, it should be noted that 
search time is dependent on the number of matching documents associated with 
the search Term; that is, the more frequent the Search Term appears in the 
Document Collection, the longer the associated Search operation will take.  As such, 
a common performance measure for the SSE Inverted Index is the amount of time 
taken to retrieve and decrypt the set of all Postings associated with the most 
commonly occurring Term within the Lexicon.  In relation to the Enron E-Mail Test 
Data Set, retrieving the set of all Postings associated with the most commonly 
occurring Lexicon Term took 53 microseconds (µs), while identifying same took 
approximately 8 microseconds (µs) for the Microsoft Office Document Collection 
Test Data Set.  
                                                     
 
16
 On average, generating a keyed hash of a single Lexicon Term (either for SSE Inverted Index 
generation or searching an SSE Inverted Index) took 35 microseconds (µs) using the implementation 
developed by Kamara et al. (2012). 
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As regards hardware, the experiments conducted by Kamara et al. (2012) were 
performed on a Windows Server 2008R2 machine with an Intel Xeon L5520 
Processor (2.26GHZ). 
2.3.4.2 Cash et al. (2013) Implementation 
The implementation of SSE developed by Cash et al. (2013) is a non-interactive, 
multiple Query Term SSE protocol.  When compared to the description of SSE 
provided previously, the implementation by Cash et al. (2013) is almost identical 
with the exception of the following: 
 The implementation supports Conjunctive and Boolean Queries – The 
description of SSE previously assumed that all Queries consisted of a single 
Term (Conjunctive/Boolean Queries were not discussed as they were ruled 
beyond the scope of this dissertation). 
 The implementation stores the entire Inverted Index; that is, Lexicon, 
Posting List and Document Collection, in secondary memory at all times (due 
to the fact the implementation is designed to scale to extremely large Data 
Sets). 
 The implementation includes a RAM resident Data Structure known as an X-
Set that works in combination with the Inverted Index Data Structure to aid 
with the execution of Conjunctive/Boolean queries. 
In terms of programming languages, the implementation of SSE by Cash et al. 
(2013) was  developed using the C programming language.  Any and all 
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cryptographic functionality associated with implementation employed the use of 
the OpenSSL library of cryptographic algorithms. 
In relation to Data Structures, a single Data Structure known as a T-Set is used to 
store both the Lexicon and the Postings in the implementation presented by Cash et 
al. (2013).  In essence, a T-Set is a modified Hash Table that can store a fixed 
number of values, instead of a single value (as is the case with a standard Hash 
Table); that is, Key => Value 1, Value 2, …, Value N (T-Set) instead of Key => Value 
(Hash Table).  When stored on disk, the T-Set is subdivided into a number of smaller 
Hash Tables, with the size of each individual Hash Table based on the characteristics 
of the underlying Operating System and storage medium. 
In terms of algorithms, the SSE implementation by Cash et al. (2013) utilises AES-
FFX for Posting encryption, while AES-HMAC or AES-CMAC is used for keyed hashing 
of Lexicon Terms17.  The exact algorithm used for Document encryption is not 
disclosed. 
In relation to Test Data, Cash et al. (2013) tested their SSE implementation against 
three separate Test Data Sets: the entire Enron E-Mail Collection18 (1.5 million 
Documents consisting of 1.2 million distinct Lexicon Terms), a 100,000 record 
Database generated from census data, and a number of subsets of the ClueWeb09 
                                                     
 
17
 The associated paper does not specify whether AES-HMAC or AES-CMAC was used during program 
execution.  The paper simply states that the chosen algorithm depends on platform characteristics. 
18
 The work of Kamara et al. (2012) – discussed previously – employed the use of a subset of the 
Enron E-mail Collection – not the entire Collection as is the case with Cash et al. (2013). 
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collection of crawled web pages (the largest of which was 410GB in size (13,284,801 
HTML Files) with approximately 2.7 billion Postings). 
In terms of Research Results, the work of Cash et al. (2013) focussed on querying 
the SSE Inverted Index using both single Term Queries and Conjunctive/Boolean 
Queries19.  As was the case with Kamara et al. (2012), the Results presented by Cash 
et al. (2013) only take into account the process of retrieving and decrypting 
matching Postings from within the SSE Inverted Index itself– the Results do not 
include the amount of time taken to retrieve matching Documents from disk and 
returning said Documents to the Client.  Identifying and decrypting those Postings 
associated with the most frequently occurring Lexicon Term for the Enron E-Mail 
Test Data Set (690,492 Postings) took approximately 70 seconds (approximately 100 
microseconds (µs) per Postings).  Unlike, Kamara et al. (2012), Cash et al. (2013) 
does not disclose the amount of time taken to generate an ESS. 
As regards hardware, the experiments conducted by Cash et al. (2013) were 
performed on an IBM Blade HS22 running a Linux operating system, with all 
secondary memory provided by a Storage Attached Network (SAN) device. 
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 Given that this dissertation is only concerned with single Term SSE Queries, only the Results of 
single Term SSE Queries – and not Conjunctive/Boolean SSE Queries - are discussed here. 
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2.3.4.3 Critical Analysis of Existing Implementations 
From the Research Results presented by Kamara et al. (2012) and Cash et al. (2013), 
it is apparent that the search time associated with SSE is impressive – to the point 
that one could argue SSE is efficient enough to be deployed in a Cloud environment. 
In addition, the work of Cash et al. (2013) proves that SSE does indeed scale to large 
Data Sets whilst maintaining its search efficiency, and also has the ability to support 
Boolean/Conjunctive Queries in an efficient manner whilst maintaining Data/Query 
Privacy. 
Despite such impressive Results, the author believes both papers focussed on the 
performance of a single component of SSE; that is, searching an SSE Inverted Index, 
and not SSE as a whole.  Specifically, the author feels that both papers have glossed 
over the topic of SSE Inverted Index Construction.  Given that constructing an SSE 
Inverted Index is a necessary pre-requisite to searching an SSE Inverted Index; the 
author feels the topic deserves significantly more attention than that which it has 
been given in the published literature thus far.  Kamara et al. (2012) cover the topic 
briefly in their work; however as indicated previously, the Results presented are 
somewhat skewed by the fact they only include the Results of converting a pre-
existing IR Inverted Index into an SSE Inverted Index – the Results do not include 
the time taken to generate the initial IR Inverted Index.  Cash et al. (2013) make no 
mention of the time taken to generate the SSE Inverted Index used in their work. 
In addition to largely ignoring the process of constructing an SSE Inverted Index, 
both papers have also ignored the process of transferring the SSE Inverted Index 
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and the encrypted Document Collection from the Client to the Server.  As Kamara et 
al. (2012) correctly points out, the time taken to transfer both the SSE Inverted 
Index and the encrypted Document Collection from the Client to the Server will vary 
depending on the underlying system (Kamara et al. (2012) failed to cover this part 
of SSE for this reason); however the author personally feels that the same can also 
be argued in relation to cryptographic operations (which are of course reported on 
in detail in both implementations). 
When discussing their Results in relation to searching an SSE Inverted Index, both 
Kamara et al. (2012) and Cash et al. (2013) readily acknowledge that their Results 
only cover searching the SSE Inverted Index and decrypting the Postings associated 
with the Lexicon Term being searched – their Results do not include the time 
associated with retrieving and forwarding matching Documents to the Client – 
another essential component of SSE. 
In addition to their failure to examine SSE as a whole, the author is also somewhat 
disappointed in the quality of information relating to the Test Data Sets and 
findings of both papers. 
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In relation to Test Data, Table 1 summarises the Test Data statistics published (and 
not published) in both papers20.   
Information Disclosed Kamara et al. (2012) Cash et al. (2013) 
Number of Documents In Data Set No Yes 
Number of Terms In Data Set No No 
Number of Unique Terms In Data Set  No Yes (Enron Data 
Set Only) 
Number of Postings In Data Set  Yes (Postings In Media 
File Data Set Not 
Disclosed) 
Yes (Postings In 
Census Data Set 
Not Disclosed) 
Number of Postings Associated With 
Highest Frequency Lexicon Term  
No Yes (Not Disclosed 
For Media File 
Data Set) 
Size of Test Data Set Yes Yes (Size Of 
Census Data Set 
Not Disclosed) 
Table 1: Test Data Statistics 
 
The total number of Terms in the Data Set is relevant in that it dictates the amount 
of work needed to be performed during Document Tokenisation; that is, IR Inverted 
Index Construction, the number of unique Terms in the Data Set is relevant in that it 
dictates the number of Terms contained within the Inverted Index (both the IR 
Inverted Index and the SSE Inverted Index),  while the number of Postings in the 
Data Set is relevant in that it dictates the number of Postings contained within the 
Inverted Index (both the IR Inverted Index and the SSE Inverted Index). The number 
of Postings associated with the highest frequency Lexicon Term is relevant in that 
                                                     
 
20
 Please note that table cells highlighted in Red denote information that has not been disclosed, 
table cells highlighted in Orange denote information that has only been partially disclosed, while 
table cells highlighted in Green denote information that has been fully disclosed. 
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the Term in question is typically used to measure the worst case scenario of 
searching an SSE Inverted Index, while the size of the Test Data Set is relevant in 
terms of transmitting the Document Collection to the Server from the Client.  As 
can be seen from Table 1, a number of these statistics are not disclosed (or are only 
partially disclosed) by the respective authors; therefore making it difficult to give 
context to the associated experiment results. 
 In relation to Inverted Index Construction statistics, Table 2 summarises the Test 
Data statistics published (and not published) in both papers20.  
Information Disclosed Kamara et al. (2012) Cash et al. (2013)  
Time Taken To Generate IR Inverted 
Index 
No No 
Size Of IR Inverted Index No No 
Time Taken To Convert IR Inverted 
Index To SSE Inverted Index 
Yes No 
Size of SSE Inverted Index No Yes 
Time Taken To Encrypt Document 
Collection 
Yes No 
Table 2: Inverted Index Construction Statistics 
 
The time taken to generate the IR Inverted Index is significant in that the processing 
time is linear in the number of Terms contained within the Document Collection.  
The time taken to generate the SSE Inverted Index is significant in that the 
processing time is linear in the number of Postings contained within the IR Inverted 
Index, while the size of the SSE Inverted Index is relevant in terms of transmitting 
the SSE Inverted Index to the Server from the Client. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, neither Kamara et al. (2012) or Cash et al. (2013) disclose 
any information in relation to IR Inverted Index Construction.  When reporting the 
Results of converting their IR Inverted Index to an SSE Inverted Index, Kamara et al. 
(2012) choose to do so by charting their Results against the size of the Test Data Set 
(in MB)21.  Personally the author feels this information would be much more 
informative if it were charted against the number of Postings in the Test Data Set, 
given that the size of the underlying Data Set in no way reflects the number of 
unique Terms or Postings in the Data Set.  For Example: a 10MB DOCX file may 
contain the same Term repeated over and over again; that is, one unique Term => 
one Posting.  In addition, the author feels that the use of the Document Collection 
size here is a poor choice given the fact that different file formats can contain the 
same number of words, but differ greatly in size (such a TXT Files and DOCX Files)21. 
In relation to Inverted Index Querying statistics, Table 3 summarises the Test Data 
statistics published (and not published) in both papers20.   
  
                                                     
 
21
 It should be noted that the chart in question also includes encrypting the associated Document 
Collection (which is of course dependant on the size of the underlying Document Collection); 
however the time associated with executing this portion of the task represents only a fraction of the 
time associated with generating the SSE Inverted Index. 
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Information Disclosed Kamara et al. (2012) Cash et al.  (2013) 
Time Taken To Generate 
ESS 
Yes No 
Time Taken To Search SSE 
Inverted Index For Highest 
Frequency Lexicon Term 
(Including Decryption Of 
Postings) 
Yes Yes 
Table 3: Inverted Index Querying Statistics. 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, both Kamara et al. (2012) and Cash et al. (2013) have 
disclosed the time taken to search the SSE Inverted Index and to identify and 
decrypt the Postings associated with the highest frequency Lexicon Term. 
Unfortunately Kamara et al. (2012) did not publish the number of Postings 
associated with the highest frequency Lexicon Term; instead the amount of time 
associated with the search was published.  Without the number of Postings 
associated with the highest frequency Lexicon Term, it is difficult to place into 
context the significance of the Results published.  In the case of Cash et al. (2013), 
both the search time and the number of Postings associated with the highest 
frequency Lexicon Term were published, therefore providing readers with the 
ability to estimate the amount of time required to decrypt a single Posting22.  In 
relation to the time taken to generate an ESS, only Kamara et al. (2012) have 
published their Results for this area.  While Cash et al. (2013) have not revealed 
                                                     
 
22
 In the case of Cash et al. (2013), approximately 700,000 Postings were identified and decrypted in 
approximately 70 seconds for the highest frequency Lexicon Term (approximately 100 microseconds 
per Posting). 
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their statistics for this part of SSE Search, the author feels it is safe to assume that 
the cost of producing an ESS is miniscule given that the implementation developed 
by Kamara et al. (2012) does so in 35 microseconds  (µs). 
In relation to Test Environment statistics, Table 4 summarises the statistics published 
(and not published) in both papers20.  
Information Disclosed Kamara et al. (2012) Cash et al. (2013) 
Operating System Yes Yes 
Processor Yes No 
RAM No No 
Hard Disk Size No No 
Table 4: Test Environment Statistics. 
 
Given the fact that both authors acknowledge the effect that the underlying system 
can have on the experiment Results produced, the author is somewhat 
disappointed in the relation to the lack of information disclosed in both papers 
regarding the underlying Test Environments (see Table 4) 20. 
In an effort to determine the performance cost of preserving Data/Query privacy 
using SSE, Cash et al. (2013) opted to perform a performance comparison between 
their implementation of SSE and a MySQL Server comprising a plaintext database. 
Personally, the author believes a comparison between an equivalent plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR) system would be a much more appropriate comparison to 
make when determining the performance cost of SSE (given the fact that plaintext 
searching is the universally accepted method of IR); nonetheless, the author 
believes that the decision to perform a comparison against MySQL can be explained 
by the fact that their implementation of SSE is optimised for searching large Data 
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Sets stored in secondary memory and not primary memory (as is the case with all 
Database Servers – including MySQL).   
2.4 Research Question(s) 
From Section 2.3.4.3 (Critical Analysis of Existing Implementations), it is apparent 
that the author has identified a number of issues with the information available 
regarding existing implementations of SSE.  In addition, the author has also 
identified that exiting Research in the area of SSE has almost exclusively focussed 
on the topic of searching in SSE, while largely ignoring the topic of SSE Inverted 
Index Construction.   
As part of this dissertation, it is the author’s intention to contribute towards the 
areas of weakness identified previously.  With this in mind, the author has 
identified the following Research Question for their dissertation: 
 RQ1: How Efficient Is Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) When 
Implemented And Deployed In A Cloud Environment? 
 RQ2: What Is The Performance Cost Of Preserving Data/Query Privacy Using 
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) When Compared To Plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR)? 
As indicated previously in Section 2.3.4.3, the existing SSE literature has failed to 
cover the whole spectrum of activities associated with SSE (see Table 5); hence RQ1.  
Additionally, the existing published literature has yet to examine the usage of SSE 
when deployed in a Cloud computing environment. 
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Activity Covered In Existing 
Published Literature 
SSE Inverted Index Construction  
IR Inverted Index Generation By Client No 
SSE Inverted Index Generation By Client Yes 
Document Collection Encryption By Client Yes 
Uploading Of SSE Inverted Index To Server No 
Uploading Of Encrypted Document Collection To Server No 
SSE Inverted Index Searching  
ESS Generation By Client Yes 
Identifying And Decrypting Matching Postings Yes 
Returning Matching Documents To Client No 
Table 5: SSE Activities Covered By Existing Literature. 
 
In relation to RQ2, the existing published literature has only compared the 
performance of SSE with a Database Server, and not a traditional plaintext IR 
system that utilises an Inverted Index (Cash et al., 2013). 
Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ1 can be found in Section 2.4.1, 
while Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ2 can be found in Section 
2.4.2. 
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2.4.1 RQ1: Sub-Questions and Hypothesis 
Regarding RQ1, SSE can be divided into two distinct operations: SSE Inverted Index 
Construction (RQ1.1) and SSE Inverted Index Querying (RQ1.2).  
Section 2.4.1.1  presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis relating to SSE Inverted 
Index Construction, while Section 2.4.1.2 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis 
relating to SSE Inverted Index Querying. 
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2.4.1.1 SSE Inverted Index Construction 
Table 6 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ1 relating to SSE Inverted Index Construction. 
RQ# Sub-Question Hypothesis 
1.1.1 How Long Does It Take To Construct An IR Inverted Index? The time taken to construct an IR Inverted Index will be 
proportional to the number of Terms contained within the 
underlying Document Collection. 
1.1.2 How Long Does It Take To Convert An IR Inverted Index Into An SSE 
Inverted Index? 
The time taken to convert a pre-existing IR Inverted Index into 
an SSE Inverted Index will be proportional to the number of 
Lexicon Terms and Postings contained within the IR Inverted 
Index. 
1.1.3 How Long Does It Take To Encrypt a Document Collection? The time taken to encrypt a Document Collection will be 
approximately equivalent to the number of Terms in the 
underlying Document Collection. 
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1.1.4 How Long Does It Take To Upload An SSE Inverted Index To The 
Server? 
The time taken to upload an SSE Inverted Index to the Server 
will be proportional to the size of the SSE Inverted Index. 
1.1.5 How Long Does It Take To Upload an Encrypted Document Collection 
to the Server? 
The time taken to upload an Encrypted Document Collection to 
the Server will be proportional to the size of the Encrypted 
Document Collection. 
Table 6: Sub-Questions And Hypothesis For RQ1 Relating To SSE Inverted Index Construction. 
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2.4.1.2 SSE Inverted Index Querying 
Table 7 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ1 relating to SSE Inverted Index Querying. 
RQ# Sub-Question Hypothesis 
1.2.1 How Long Does It Take To Generate An Encrypted Search String 
(ESS)? 
The time taken to generate an ESS will be proportional to the size of 
the plaintext Search String. 
1.2.2 How Long Does It Take To Search An SSE Inverted Index? The time take to Search an SSE Inverted Index will be proportional to 
the number of Postings associated with the Lexicon Term searched for. 
1.2.3 How Long Does It Take To Return All Matching Documents To 
The Client? 
The time taken to return all matching Documents to the Client will be 
proportional to the size of the matching Document Collection 
Table 7: Sub-Questions And Hypothesis For RQ1 Relating To SSE Inverted Index Querying. 
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2.4.2 RQ2: Sub-Questions and Hypothesis 
Regarding RQ2, SSE and plaintext IR can be divided into two distinct operations: Document Collection Uploading (RQ2.1) and Inverted Index 
Querying (RQ2.2). 
Section 2.4.2.1 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis relating to Document Collection Uploading, while Section 2.4.2.2 presents Sub-
Questions and Hypothesis relating to Inverted Index Querying. 
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2.4.2.1 Plaintext IR Uploading Vs. SSE Uploading 
Table 8 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ2 relating to Document Collection Uploading. 
RQ# Sub-Question Hypothesis 
2.1.1 How Long Does It Take To Upload A Document Collection Using SSE, When Compared 
With Traditional Plaintext Information Retrieval (IR)? 
Uploading a Document Collection using 
SSE will take longer when compared to 
plaintext IR due to the requirement of the 
Client to generate an SSE Inverted Index 
(and upload it to the Server), as well as 
the requirement that the Client will 
encrypt the associated Document 
Collection prior to uploading it to the 
Server. 
Table 8: Sub-Questions and Hypothesis for RQ2 Relating To Document Collection Uploading 
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2.4.2.2 Plaintext IR Querying Vs. SSE Querying 
Table 9 presents Sub-Questions and Hypothesis emanating from RQ2 relating to Inverted Index Querying. 
RQ# Sub-Question Hypothesis 
2.2.1 How Long Does It Take To Query An SSE Inverted Index, When Compared To 
Traditional Plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Inverted Index Querying? 
Querying an Inverted Index using SSE will take 
longer when compared to plaintext IR due to the 
requirement of the Server to decrypt SSE Postings. 
Table 9: Sub-Questions and Hypothesis for RQ2 Relating To Inverted Index Querying 
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3. Software Requirements Specification 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Purpose 
This Chapter provides a detailed description of the Software Requirements for the 
initial prototypes of the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” and “CipherTXT 
Storage and Search Engine“ applications developed as part of this dissertation. 
3.1.2 Project Scope 
Both software artefacts produced as part of this dissertation have been developed 
with a view to providing answers to the Research Questions identified previously in 
Chapter 2.  Both artefacts are examples of personal file hosting applications.  Like 
all file hosting applications, the objective of both the “PlainTXT Storage and Search 
Engine” and “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine“ is to allow service users to 
store their files in the Cloud, and to access/retrieve those files as and when needed 
(via a web browser). 
In the case of the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application, users will be 
able to store their personal files in plaintext form, as well as having the ability to 
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search and retrieve those files by forwarding queries to the application in plaintext 
form. 
In the case of the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application, users will be 
provided with the exact same functionality as the “PlainTXT Storage and Search 
Engine” application, with the exception that both user’s files and queries are 
encrypted prior to being forwarded to the application for storage/usage. 
Given the prototype status of both applications, a number of standard features and 
functionality typically associated with personal file hosting services have been 
classified as out of scope for the initial version of both software artefacts.  Features 
and functionality considered out of scope for both applications can be seen in Table 
10: 
No Support for Multiple Users The initial prototype(s) will be designed 
and implemented with a single user in 
mind.  Support for this feature may be 
added in future editions. 
No Support for User Authentication The initial prototype(s) will be designed 
and implemented without user 
authentication.  Simply accessing the 
application(s) at their specified URLs will 
provide the user with access to the full 
functionality of the application(s) (no 
username/password will be necessary).  
Support for this feature may be added in 
future editions. 
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Limited File Format Support The initial prototype(s) will only allow 
for TXT files to be uploaded to the 
application(s).  Support for additional 
file formats may be added in future 
editions. 
No Support for Viewing List of 
Documents Uploaded Previously 
The user will be unable to view the list of 
files they have uploaded to the 
application(s) previously.  Support for 
this feature may be added in future 
editions. 
No Support for Viewing File Contents 
Online 
The user will be unable to view the 
contents of files online; that is, within 
the browser, irrespective of its file 
format.  Instead, users will have to 
download files to a client machine in 
order to view them.  Support for this 
feature may be added in future editions. 
No Support for Document Collection 
Updates 
Once a Document Collection has been 
uploaded to the Server, the user will be 
unable to update that Document 
Collection; that is, add an additional 
Document to the Collection, edit an 
existing Document within the Collection 
or delete an existing Document within 
the Collection.  Essentially, the 
Document Collection will be non-
modifiable unless the Document 
Collection is overwritten with a newly 
uploaded Document Collection.  Support 
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for this feature may be added in future 
editions. 
Limited Query Support The initial prototype(s) will only allow 
for single Term Queries (as was the case 
with the Literature Review).  Support for 
multi-Term Queries and other advanced 
forms of Querying may be added in 
future editions. 
No Support For Document ID 
Generation 
The initial prototype(s) will not support 
the generation of unique Document IDs 
for TXT Documents uploaded to the 
Server.  Instead, the initial prototype(s) 
assumes the user has chosen a unique 
numeric name for each TXT Document, 
prior to being uploaded to the Server.  
Support for this feature may be added in 
future editions. 
Table 10: Features Considered Out Of Scope For Software Artefacts. 
3.1.3 Overview 
Section 3.2.1 presents the Functional Requirements for the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application, while Section 3.2.2 presents the Functional 
Requirements for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
Section 3.3 presents a set of Non-Functional Requirements that apply to both 
applications. 
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3.2 Functional Requirements 
3.2.1 PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine 
The following are the Functional Requirements for the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application: 
 PFR-001: Upload TXT Document(s) To Server. 
 
 PFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Specified Search String. 
 
3.2.2 CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine 
The following are the Functional Requirements for the “CipherTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application: 
 CFR-001: Encrypt and Upload TXT Document(s) To Server. 
 
 CFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Encrypted Search String. 
 
 CFR-003: Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Retrieved From Server. 
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3.3 Non-Functional Requirements 
The following are the Non-Functional Requirements for both the “PlainTXT Storage 
and Search Engine” application and the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” 
application: 
 NFR-001: The software shall be Efficient. 
 
 NFR-002: The software shall be Robust. 
 
 NFR-003: The software shall be Maintainable. 
 
 NFR-004: The software shall be Reliable. 
 
 NFR-005: The software shall be Usable. 
 
 NFR-006: The software shall be Secure. 
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4. Software Design 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides the Design details for the “PlainTXT Storage and Search 
Engine” and “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” applications developed as part 
of this dissertation.  Section 4.2 incorporates the High-Level Design details of both 
applications; that is, Use Case Descriptions, Detailed Activity Diagrams and User 
Interface Design, while Section 4.3 incorporates the Low-Level Design of both 
applications; that is, Sequence Diagrams. 
4.2 High Level Design 
Section 4.2.1 denotes the Use Case Descriptions associated with both the “PlainTXT 
Storage and Search Engine” application as well as the “CipherTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application.  Section 4.2.2 denotes the Detailed Activity Diagrams 
associated with same, while Section 4.2.3 denotes the User Interface Design 
diagrams associated with same. 
4.2.1 Use Case Descriptions 
Section 4.2.1.1 denotes the Use Case Descriptions associated with the ‘PlainTX 
Storage and Search Engine’ application, while Section 4.2.1.2 denotes the Use Case 
Descriptions associated with the ‘CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine’ application. 
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4.2.1.1 PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.2.1.1.1 outlines the Use Case Description for PFR-001; Section 4.2.1.1.2 
outlines the Use Case Description for PFR-002, while Section 4.2.1.1.3 provides a 
graphical summary (in the form of an Activity Diagram) of both Use Case 
Descriptions. 
Figure 14 outlines the Use Case Diagram associated with the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 14: “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” Use Case Diagram. 
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4.2.1.1.1 PFR-001: Upload TXT Document(s) To Server Use Case 
Use Case Upload TXT Document(s) To Server. 
Objective To Upload One Or More TXT Files To The Server. 
Pre-Condition 1. Server Is Running. 
2. User Has Connected To Application. 
Main Flow 1. User Selects ‘Upload File(s)’ Button. 
 2. Application Displays A Dialog Box Consisting Of Two 
 Buttons – One Titled ‘Choose Files’ (To Select Which Files 
 To Upload) – And Another Titled ‘Upload’ (Which 
 Forwards The Chosen Files To The Server For Storage). 
3. User Selects ‘Choose Files’ Button. 
 4. Application Displays A File Chooser Dialog Box (Options: 
 Open, Cancel). 
5. User Chooses TXT File(s) To Be Uploaded To Server. 
6. User Chooses ‘Open’. 
 7. File Chooser Dialog Box Closes. 
8. User Selects ‘Upload’ Button. 
 9. Application Displays ‘Upload Successful’. 
Alternative 
Flow 
1A. User Fails To Select ‘Upload File(s)’ Button. 
2A. Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
3A. User Fails To Select ‘Choose File(s)’ Button. 
4A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
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5A. User Fails To Select Any Files To Upload. 
6A. User Chooses ‘Cancel’ Button. 
7A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Close. 
8A. User Fails To Select ‘Upload’ Button. 
9A. Application Displays ‘Upload Failed’. 
Post Condition Users Files Have Been Uploaded To Server. 
Table 11: PFR-001: Upload TXT Document(s) To Server Use Case Description. 
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4.2.1.1.2 PFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Specified Search 
String Use Case 
Use Case Retrieve TXT Document(s) Containing Specified Search String. 
Objective To Retrieve Those Files From The Server That Contain A Specified 
Search String. 
Pre-Condition 1. Server Is Running. 
2. User Has Connected To Application. 
3. TXT Files Have Been Uploaded To Server Previously. 
Main Flow 1. User Enters Search String Into ‘Search’ Text Field. 
2. User Selects ‘Search’ Button. 
 3. Application Transmits ZIP File To User Containing All TXT 
 Files Containing Specified Search String. 
Alternative 
Flow 
1A. User Fails To Enter Search String Into ‘Search’ Text Field. 
2A. User Fails To Select ‘Search’ Button. 
3A. No TXT Files Contain Specified Search String. 
Post Condition User Receives ZIP File From Server Containing All TXT Files 
Matching Specified Search String. 
Table 12: PFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Specified Search String Use Case 
Description. 
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4.2.1.1.3 Use Case Summary (Activity Diagram) 
The following Activity Diagram summarises the steps involved in each Use Case for the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 15: “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” Activity Diagram (Use Case Description Summary). 
 95 
 
 
4.2.1.2 CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.2.1.2.1  outlines the Use Case Description for CFR-001; Section 4.2.1.2.2 
outlines the Use Case Description for CFR-002; Section 4.2.1.2.3 outlines the Use 
Case Description for CFR-003, while Section 4.2.1.2.4 provides a graphical summary 
(in the form of an Activity Diagram) of all three Use Case Descriptions.  
Figure 16 outlines the Use Case Diagram associated with the “CipherTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 16: “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” Use Case Diagram. 
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4.2.1.2.1 CFR-001: Encrypt and Upload TXT Document(s) To Server Use Case 
Use Case Encrypt and Upload TXT Document(s) To Server. 
Objective To Encrypt One Or More TXT Files And Upload Them To The 
Server (In Encrypted Form). 
Pre-Condition 1. Server Is Running. 
2. User Has Connected To Application. 
Main Flow 1. User Selects ‘Upload File(s)’ Button. 
 2. Application Displays A Dialog Box Consisting Of Three 
 Text Fields And Two Buttons. 
 Text Fields: 
  ‘Lexicon Password’ (Password To Encrypt Inverted 
  Index Lexicon With). 
  ‘Postings Password’ (Master Key Used To Generate 
  Posting Passwords). 
  Document Password (Password To Encrypt  
  Documents With). 
 Buttons: 
   ‘Choose Files’ (To Select Which Files  To Upload) 
  ‘Upload’ (Forwards Chosen Files To The Server For 
  Storage). 
3. User Enters Lexicon Password Into ‘Lexicon Password’ Text 
Field. 
4. User Enters Master Postings Password Into ‘Postings Password’ 
Text Field. 
5. User Enters Document Password Into ‘Document Password’ 
Text Field. 
6. User Selects ‘Choose Files’ Button. 
 7. Application Displays A File Chooser Dialog Box (Options: 
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 Open, Cancel). 
8. User Chooses TXT File(s) To Be Uploaded To Server. 
9. User Chooses ‘Open’. 
 10. File Chooser Dialog Box Closes. 
11. User Selects ‘Upload’ Button. 
 12. Application Displays ‘Upload Successful’. 
Alternative 
Flow 
1A. User Fails To Select ‘Upload File(s)’ Button. 
2A. Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
3A. User Fails To Enter Lexicon Password Into ‘Lexicon Password’ 
Text Field. 
4A. User Fails To Enter Master Postings Password Into ‘Postings 
Password’ Text Field. 
5A. User Fails To Enter Document Password Into ‘Document 
Password’ Text Field. 
6A. User Fails To Select ‘Choose File(s)’ Button. 
7A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
8A. User Fails To Select Any Files To Upload.  
9A. User Selects ‘Cancel’ Button. 
10A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Close. 
11A. User Fails To Select ‘Upload’ Button. 
12A. Application Displays ‘Upload Failed’. 
Post Condition Users TXT Files Have Been Encrypted And Uploaded To Server. 
Table 13: CFR-001: Encrypt and Upload TXT Document(s) To Server Use Case Description.  
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4.2.1.2.2 CFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Encrypted Search 
String Use Case 
Use Case Retrieve TXT Document(s) Containing Encrypted Search String. 
Objective To Retrieve Those Files From The Server That Contain A Specified 
Encrypted Search String. 
Pre-Condition 1. Server Is Running. 
2. User Has Connected To Application. 
3. TXT Files Have Been Uploaded To Server Previously. 
Main Flow 1. User Enters Search String Into ‘Search’ Text Field. 
2. User Enters Lexicon Password Into ‘Lexicon Password’ Text 
Field. 
3. User Enters Postings Password Into ‘Postings Password’ Text 
Field. 
4. User Selects ‘Search’ Button. 
 5. Application Transmits ZIP File To User Containing All TXT 
 Files Containing Encrypted Search String. 
Alternative 
Flow 
1A. User Fails To Enter Search String Into ‘Search’ Text Field. 
2A. User Fails To Enter Lexicon Password Into ‘Lexicon Password’ 
Text Field. 
2B. User Enters Incorrect Lexicon Password Into ‘Lexicon 
Password’ Text Field. 
3A. User Fails To Enter Postings Password Into ‘Postings 
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Password’ Text Field. 
3B. User Enters Incorrect Postings Password Into ‘Postings 
Password’ Text Field. 
4A. User Fails To Select ‘Search’ Button. 
5A. Valid Lexicon Password Used – Valid Postings Password Used -
No TXT Files Contain Encrypted Search String. 
5B. Invalid Lexicon Password Used - Valid Postings Password Used 
- No TXT Files Contain Encrypted Search String. 
5C. Valid Lexicon Password Used – Invalid Postings Password Used 
-No TXT Files Contain Encrypted Search String. 
5D. Invalid Lexicon Password Used - Invalid Postings Password 
Used - No TXT Files Contain Encrypted Search String. 
Post Condition User Receives ZIP File From Server Containing All TXT Files 
Matching Encrypted Search String. 
Table 14: CFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Encrypted Search String Use Case 
Description. 
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4.2.1.2.3 CFR-003: Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Retrieved From Server 
Use Case.   
Use Case Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Retrieved From Server. 
Objective To Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Received From Server 
(Contained Within ZIP File). 
Pre-Condition 1. Server Is Running. 
2. User Has Connected To Application. 
3. The User Possess A ZIP File Comprising Encrypted TXT 
Documents. 
Main Flow 1. User Selects ‘Decrypt’ Button. 
 2. Application Displays A Dialog Box Consisting Of One 
 Text Field And Two Buttons. 
 Text Fields: 
  Document Password (Password To Decrypt  
  TXT Documents With). 
 Buttons: 
   ‘Choose ZIP File’ (To Select ZIP File Containing 
  TXT Documents) 
  ‘Unzip/Decrypt Files’ (To Decrypt TXT Files  
  Contained Within Designated ZIP File Using  
  Specified Password). 
3. User Enters Document Password Into ‘Document Password’ 
 101 
 
Text Field. 
4. User Selects ‘Choose ZIP File’ Button. 
 5. Application Displays A File Chooser Dialog Box 
 (Options: Open, Cancel). 
6. User Chooses ZIP File Containing Encrypted TXT Documents. 
7. User Chooses ‘Open’. 
 8. File Chooser Dialog Box Closes. 
9. User Selects ‘Unzip/Decrypt Files’ Button. 
 10. Application Generates A Folder (In The Same 
 Location As The ZIP File Selected) Containing All TXT 
 Files In Plaintext Form. 
Alternative Flow 1A. User Fails To Select ‘Decrypt Files’ Button. 
2A. Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
3A. User Fails To Enter Document Password Into ‘Document 
Password’ Text Field. 
3B. User Enters Incorrect Document Password Into ‘Document 
Password’ Text Field. 
4A. User Fails To Select ‘Choose ZIP File’ Button. 
5A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Display. 
6A. User Fails To Choose ZIP File.  
6B. User Chooses Incorrect ZIP File.  For Example: a ZIP File 
Containing No Encrypted TXT Documents. 
7A. User Selects ‘Cancel’ Button. 
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8A. File Chooser Dialog Box Fails To Close. 
9A. User Fails To Select ‘Unzip/Decrypt Files’ Button. 
10A. Application Unable To Decrypt TXT Files – Incorrect 
Password Entered. 
Post Condition User Possesses Folder Containing TXT Files In Plaintext Form 
(Having Previously Been In Ciphertext Form). 
Table 15: CFR-003: Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Retrieved From Server Use Case 
Description. 
4.2.1.2.4 Use Case Summary (Activity Diagram) 
The Activity Diagram overleaf summarises the steps involved in each Use Case for 
the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application.
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Figure 17: “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” Activity Diagram (Use Case Description Summary).
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4.2.2 Detailed Activity Diagram 
The Activity Diagrams encountered previously in Section 4.2.1 simply listed the 
steps involved in each Use Case from the end users perspective.  Neither diagram 
outlined the processing steps to be carried out as part of each Use Case, nor did 
they designate what processing is performed by the Client and what processing is 
performed by the Server.  
Section 4.2.2.1 denotes the Detailed Activity Diagram for the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application, while Section 4.2.2.2 denotes the Detailed Activity 
Diagram for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application.  In both 
Diagrams, user actions are highlighted in Green; processing carried out by the Client 
is highlighted in Blue; while processing carried out by the Server is highlighted in 
Red. 
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4.2.2.1 PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine 
 
Figure 18: PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine - Detailed Activity Diagram. 
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4.2.2.2 CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine 
 
Figure 19: CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine - Detailed Activity Diagram.  
 107 
 
4.2.3 User Interface Design 
Section 4.2.3.1 denotes the User Interface Design for the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application, while Section 4.2.3.2 denotes the User Interface Design 
for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
4.2.3.1 PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.2.3.1.1 denotes the User Interface Design of the Home Page for the 
“PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application, while Section 4.2.3.1.2 denotes 
the User Interface Design of the Upload page for same.  
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4.2.3.1.1 Home Page (Includes Search Bar) 
Figure 20 denotes the User Interface Design of the Home Page for the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 20: PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine - Home Page Design. 
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4.2.3.1.2 Upload Page 
Figure 21 denotes the User Interface Design of the Upload Page for the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 21: PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine - Upload Page Design. 
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4.2.3.2 CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.2.3.2.1  denotes the User Interface Design of the Home Page for the 
“CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application, Section 4.2.3.2.2 denotes the 
User Interface Design of the Upload page for same, while Section 4.2.3.2.3 denotes 
the User Interface Design of the Decrypt page for same also. 
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4.2.3.2.1 Home Page (Includes Search Bar) 
Figure 22 denotes the User Interface Design of the Home Page for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 22: CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine - Home Page Design. 
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4.2.3.2.2 Upload Page 
Figure 23 denotes the User Interface Design of the Upload Page for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 23: CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine - Upload Page Design. 
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4.2.3.2.3 Decrypt Page 
Figure 24 denotes the User Interface Design of the Decrypt Page for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application. 
 
Figure 24: CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine - Decrypt Page Design.
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4.3 Low Level Design 
Section 4.3.1 denotes the Sequence Diagrams associated with both the “PlainTXT 
Storage and Search Engine” application as well as the “CipherTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application. 
4.3.1 Sequence Diagrams 
Section 4.3.1.1 denotes the Sequence Diagrams associated with the various Use 
Cases of the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” application, while Section 4.3.1.2 
denotes same for the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” 
Components highlighted in red in the following Sequence Diagrams denote 
Components residing on the Client-Side of the associated functionality, while 
Components highlighted in blue denote Components residing on the Server-Side of 
the associated functionality. 
4.3.1.1 PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.3.1.1.1 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with PFR-001, while 
Section 4.3.1.1.2 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with PFR-002. 
 115 
 
4.3.1.1.1 PFR-001: Upload TXT Document(s) To Server 
Due to the size of the Sequence Diagram associated with PFR-001, the author has 
had to split the Sequence Diagram in to two separate Diagrams.  The first half of the 
Sequence Diagram denotes the functionality from the perspective of the Client (see 
Figure 25), while the second half of the Sequence Diagram denotes the functionality 
from the perspective of the Server (see Figure 26). 
In relation to the POST(PT_FILE_UPLOAD_URL) and 
POST(PT_GENERATE_INVERTED_INDEX_URL) interactions between the 
PT_Client_To_Server and Web_Server components in Figure 25, the reader 
should be aware that the Server Side functionality associated with both interactions 
has been abbreviated in Figure 25, but is expanded upon in detail in Figure 26.
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Figure 25: PFR-001 Sequence Diagram (Client Side). 
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Figure 26: PFR-001 Sequence Diagram (Server Side). 
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4.3.1.1.2 PFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Specified Search String 
Figure 27 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with PFR-002. 
 
Figure 27: PFR-002 Sequence Diagram.
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4.3.1.2 CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine 
Section 4.3.1.2.1 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-001, Section 
4.3.1.2.2  denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-002, while Section 
4.3.1.2.3 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-003. 
4.3.1.2.1 CFR-001: Encrypt and Upload TXT Document(s) To Server 
Due to the size of the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-001, the author has 
had to split the Sequence Diagram in to three separate Diagrams.  The first third of 
the Sequence Diagram denotes the functionality from the perspective of the Client 
(see Figure 28); however the reader should be aware that a number of details 
associated with the Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() method have been 
abbreviated for readability purposes (these details can however be seen in Figure 29 
– the second third of the Diagram).  In addition, a number of details associated with 
both the POST(CT_FILE_UPLOAD_URL) and POST(CT_ 
INVERTED_INDEX_UPLOAD_URL) interactions between the 
CT_Client_To_Server and Web_Server components in Figure 28  have been 
abbreviated, however these are expanded upon in detail in Figure 30 which denotes 
the functionality from the perspective of the Server (the final third of the Diagram).
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Figure 28: CFR-001 Sequence Diagram (Client Side – With Genereate_SSE_Inverted_Index() Details Omitted).
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Figure 29: Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() Sequence Diagram. 
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Figure 30: CFR-001 Sequence Diagram (Server Side).
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4.3.1.2.2 CFR-002: Retrieve TXT Documents Containing Encrypted Specified Search String Use Case 
Figure 31  denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-002. 
 
Figure 31: CFR-002 Sequence Diagram. 
 124 
 
4.3.1.2.3 CFR-003: Decrypt Encrypted TXT Documents Retrieved From Server 
Figure 32 denotes the Sequence Diagram associated with CFR-003. 
 
Figure 32: CFR-003 Sequence Diagram.
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5. Implementation 
Both the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” and “CipherTXT Storage and Search 
Engine“ applications developed as part of this dissertation were implemented using 
the Java Programming Language.  All Client-Side functionality associated with both 
applications was implemented in the form of Java Applets, while all Server-Side 
functionality was implemented in the form of Java Servlets. 
The SSE scheme underlying the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application 
is the scheme described previously in the Literature Review (Chapter 2); that is, 
Kamara et al. (2012).  As such, all Data Structures and Security measures outlined 
previously in Section 2.3 have been applied and utilised in the implementation of 
SSE developed as part of this dissertation. 
The core functionality of the “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application is 
contained within the following Java Classes and Java Methods: 
 Tokeniser.JAVA (see Section 5.1) 
 Inverted_Index.JAVA (see Section 5.1) 
 Crypto_Methods.JAVA (see Section 5.2) 
 Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() Method (Contained Within 
Inverted_Index.JAVA - see Section 5.3) 
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 SSE_Inverted_Index.JAVA (see Section 5.3) 
 Encrypted_Array_Node.JAVA (see Section 5.3) 
 Randomised_Encrypted_Array.JAVA (see Section 5.3) 
 Retrieve() Method (Contained Within 
SSE_Inverted_Index.JAVA - see Section 5.4) 
 
5.1 Tokeniser.JAVA and 
Inverted_Index.JAVA 
The Tokeniser Class is responsible for Document Tokenisation in both the 
“PlainTXT Search and Storage Engine” and “CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” 
applications developed as part of this dissertation. 
An array of File Objects (representing the chosen Document Collection) is first 
passed into the Tokenise_Collection() method of the Tokeniser Class, 
which then proceeds to tokenise each Document on a one-by-one basis.   
The individual Terms contained within each TXT file are retrieved using the 
Scanner Class and its next() Method.  Each Term encountered during 
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Document Tokenisation is passed to an Inverted_Index Object (which 
comprises a HashMap<String, HashSet<Integer>> Object)23. 
Before a given Term is added into the underlying HashMap Object, the HashMap 
is first examined to determine whether or not the Term was added to the 
HashMap previously24.  In the event that a Term was not added to the HashMap 
previously, the Term is simply inserted directly in to the HashMap along with a 
HashSet Object comprising the DocID of the Document currently being tokenised.  
In the event that the Term was present in the HashMap previously, the Terms 
associated HashSet is instead retrieved from the HashMap and then updated to 
include the ID of the Document currently being tokenised (before then being re-
inserted into the HashMap). 
 
5.2 Crypto_Methods.JAVA 
 All cryptographic functionality associated with the “CipherTXT Storage and Search 
Engine” application is contained within the Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class. 
The Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprises the following methods: 
 Keyed_Hash() 
                                                     
 
23
 String => Lexicon Term; HashSet<Integer> => Posting List associated with Lexicon Term. 
24
 Simply adding the Term directly to the HashMap will overwrite the existing entry (if any) 
(including the set of Document IDs associated with the Term previously). 
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 Generate_Random_Postings_Key() 
 Encrypt_UTF8() 
 Decrypt_UTF8() 
 Encrypt_Encryption_Key() 
 Decrypt_Decryption_Key() 
 Derive_Key() 
 Encrypt_Files() 
 Decrypt_Files() 
The Keyed_Hash()method of the Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprises 
an instance of the built in Java Mac Class.  The Mac Object is configured to generate 
keyed hash values using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm.  The Keyed_Hash()method 
is used for two purposes in the implementation of SSE developed as part of this 
dissertation: 1) To generate a keyed hash for each Lexicon Term within the SSE 
Inverted Index, and 2) To generate the encryption/decryption key used to 
encrypt/decrypt the first Posting associated with each Lexicon Term.  The method 
returns a Base64 encoded String representation of the keyed hash value 
generated. 
The Generate_Random_Postings_Key()method of the 
Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprises an instance of the built in Java 
SecureRandom Class.  The SecureRandom Object is configured to generate a 
randomised 128 bit value which can be used to encrypt the second (and all 
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subsequent) Posting associated with a given Lexicon Term.  The method returns a 
Base64 encoded String representation of the key generated. 
The Encrypt_UTF8()and Decrypt_UTF8() methods of the 
Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprise two instances of the built in Java 
Cipher Class.  The Cipher Object in the Encrypt_UTF8()Method is 
configured to encrypt UTF8 encoded Strings into Base64 encoded Strings 
using AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding encryption, while the Cipher Object in the 
Decrypt_UTF8()Method is configured to decipher encrypted Base64 encoded 
Strings into plaintext UTF8 encoded Strings using same.  The 
Encrypt_UTF8() and Decrypt_UTF8() Methods are used to encrypt and 
decrypt Postings and Posting Pointers in the implementation of SSE developed as 
part of this dissertation. 
The Encrypt_Encryption_Key()and Decrypt_Decryption_Key() 
methods of the Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprise two instances of the 
built in Java CipherInputStream Class.  The CipherInputStream Object in 
the Encrypt_Encryption_Key() Method is configured to convert Base64 
encoded Strings into encrypted Base64 encoded Strings using 
AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding encryption, while the CipherInputStream Object in 
the Decrypt_Decryption_Key()Method is configured to convert encrypted 
Base64 encoded Strings into plaintext Base64 encoded Strings using same.  
The Encrypt_Encryption_Key() and Decrypt_Decryption_Key() 
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Methods are used to encrypt and decrypt Posting keys generated by the 
Generate_Random_Postings_Key() Method outlined previously. 
The Derive_Key()method of the Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprises 
an instance of the built in Java SecretKeyFactory Class.  The 
SecretKeyFactory Object is configured to generate a secret key value using 
the PBKDFHMAC-SHA1 algorithm.  The Derive_Key()method of the 
Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class is used to derive encryption/decryption keys for 
TXT file encryption in the implementation of SSE developed as part of this 
dissertation. 
The Encrypt_Files()and Decrypt_Files() methods of the 
Crypto_Methods.JAVA Class comprise two instances of the built in Java 
Cipher Class.  The Cipher Object in the Encrypt_Files() Method is 
configured to convert plaintext TXT files into encrypted TXT files using 
AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding encryption, while the Decrypt_Files()Method is 
configured to convert encrypted TXT files into plaintext TXT files using same.   
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5.3 Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() 
Method, SSE_Inverted_Index.JAVA, 
Encrypted_Array_Node.JAVA , and 
Randomised_Encrypted_Array.JAVA. 
The Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() Method of the Inverted_Index 
Class is responsible for converting an IR Inverted Index into an SSE Inverted Index in 
the implementation of SSE developed as part of this dissertation. 
As part of the process of generating an SSE Inverted Index, the 
Generate_SSE_Inverted_Index() Method first iterates over all entries 
within the HashMap<String, HashSet<Integer>> Object underlying the 
Inverted_Index. 
For each Lexicon Term contained within the plaintext IR HashMap, a 
Keyed_Hash() is generated for the Term, along with a password which will be 
used later to encrypt the first Posting associated with the Lexicon Term (also 
generated using the Keyed_Hash() method; albeit with a different password). 
Following this, the set of all Posting associated the Lexicon Term are then retrieved 
and iterated over; that is, the HashSet<Integer> Object contained within the 
IR HashMap Object. 
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For each Posting encountered, the associated Document ID is then encrypted and 
added to an Encrypted_Array_Node Object.  In the case of the first Posting, 
the Posting is encrypted using the second Keyed_Hash() value generated from 
its associated Lexicon Term, while all subsequent Postings are encrypted using keys 
generated using the Generate_Random_Postings_Key() Method of the 
Crypto_Methods Class (Note that each Encrypted_Array_Node Object is 
encrypted using a different randomised key) . 
The Encrypted_Array_Node Object associated with the first Posting is stored 
alongside its associated Lexicon Term within the HashMap<String, 
Encrypted_Array_Node> Object contained with the 
SSE_Inverted_Index, while all subsequent Postings are stored within the 
Randomised_Encrypted_Array Object contained with the 
SSE_Inverted_Index. 
In addition to storing encrypted Postings, each Encrypted_Array_Node Object 
also stores the location of the next Encrypted_Array_Node Object associated 
with the Lexicon Term in question, as well as the key necessary to decrypt the 
contents of the next Encrypted_Array_Node Object.  As such, whenever a 
new Encrypted_Array_Node Object is created, its associated encryption key is 
then stored in the Encrypted_Array_Node Object that preceded it in the list 
of Postings (with the exception of the first Encrypted_Array_Node Object 
associated with a Lexicon Term - SSE requires the user to be able to manually 
generate this key as and when needed).  In addition, whenever an 
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Encrypted_Array_Node Object is inserted into the 
Randomised_Encrypted_Array Object, the randomised Array Index assigned 
to the Encrypted_Array_Node Object is then stored in the 
Encrypted_Array_Node Object that preceded it in the list of Postings. 
5.4 Retrieve() Method 
The Retrieve() Method of the SSE_Inverted_Index  Class is responsible 
for searching25 the SSE Inverted Index associated with the implementation of SSE 
developed as part of this dissertation. 
Prior to executing the Retrieve() Method, the user must first generate a 
Keyed_Hash() of their Search Term, as well as the Postings Password associated 
with their Search Term (again, generated using the Keyed_Hash() Method). 
The Keyed_Hash() associated with the users Search Term is then used to lookup 
the HashMap<String, Encrypted_Array_Node> Object contained with 
the SSE_Inverted_Index Class. 
Should the Search Term be present in the HashMap, the associated 
Encrypted_Array_Node Object is then returned from the HashMap and 
decrypted using the Postings Password generated by the user. 
                                                     
 
25
 Note that searching the SSE Inverted Index also included identifying and decrypting all Postings 
associated with the Lexicon Term searched for. 
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Decrypting the Encrypted_Array_Node reveals three pieces of information: 
 The Document ID associated with the Posting,  
 The index location of the next Encrypted_Array_Node Object 
associated with the Search Term (contained within the 
Randomised_Encrypted_Array associated with the 
SSE_Inverted_Index). 
 The key required to decrypt the next Encrypted_Array_Node. 
The process then repeats until a Randomised_Encrypted_Array Node is 
found that contains no index location for a next Posting.  At this point, the set of all 
Postings associated with the Search Term have been identified and decrypted. 
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6. Testing 
Section 6.1 denotes the details associated with the hardware/software used during 
Testing, Section 6.2 denotes the details associated with the Data Sets used during 
Testing, while Section 6.3 denotes the Experimental Results obtained during 
Testing. 
6.1 Test Environment 
Table 16 denotes the details associated with the pertinent software utilised during 
application Testing, while Table 17 denotes the details associated with the hardware 
utilised during application Testing.  
Operating System: Windows Ultimate 64-Bit SP1 
Java Development Kit (JDK): 
Java Runtime Environment (JRE): 
Java Version: 8 
Update: 51 
Build: 16 
Web Server (Localhost): Apache Tomcat 7.0.56 
Included As Part Of XAMMP 5.6.8 Package 
Table 16: Test Environment - Pertinent Software Details. 
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Device Type: Laptop 
Processor: Intel Core i7 4900MQ @2.8GHz 
Quad Core 
Motherboard: Notebook W35xSS_370SS Motherboard 
RAM: 24GB RAM (3 X 8GB KINGSTON DDR3 @ 800MHz) 
 
Hard Disk: 925GB SSHD 
RAID: RAID 1 (Software Based RAID) 
Table 17: Test Environment - Hardware Details. 
All tests were conducted using the default Java Virtual Machine (JVM) - no 
additional runtime parameters were configured. 
6.2 Test Data 
All experiments conducted as part of this dissertation were performed on the ’20 
Newsgroups’ Data Set (Rennie, 2008). 
In its original form, the ’20 Newsgroups’ Data Set consists of 18,828 files, 
subdivided into 20 folders.  Initially, each file in the Data Set has a numeric file 
name between 4 and 6 digits in length26 with no file extension. 
                                                     
 
26
 Recall previously from the Software Requirements Specification that it is assumed that each file in 
the Test Data Set has a unique numeric name assigned to it. 
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Prior to being used in the experiments, the author first attempted to move all files 
in the Data Set into a single folder; however at this point the author noted that the 
names of all files in the Data Set are not unique (the contents of each file are 
unique however (Rennie, 2008)).  In an effort to avoid duplicate file names, the 
author randomly assigned an 8 digit numeric name to each file in the Data Set26.  In 
addition, the author also appended the TXT file extension to each file in the Data 
Set. 
As part of Testing, the author tested each aspect of SSE with Data Sets that 
increased in size by an order of magnitude.  As such, it was necessary to derive 
smaller subsets from the full ’20 Newsgroups’ Test Data Set.  In total, 5 subsets 
were derived (DS1 – DS5).  The details associated with each subset – and the full 
Data Set (DS6) – can be seen in Table 18.  
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Data Set Name DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 DS6 
# of Docs 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 18,828 
# of Terms 320 2,612 33,611 281,363 2,738,580 5,130,520 
# of Unique 
Terms  
206 1,297 10,996 52,134 258,463 377,880 
# of Postings In 
Data Set  
206 1,650 19,838 168,768 1,672,576 3,138,449 
# of Postings 
Associated 
With Highest 
Frequency 
Lexicon Term  
1 
 
All Terms 
10 
 
And 
100 
 
Subject: 
1,000 
 
From: 
10,000 
 
Subject: 
18,828 
 
Subject: 
Size 1.9KB 16.1 
KB 
215KB 1.7MB 17.3MB 32.3MB 
Table 18: Test Data Set Statistics27. 
6.3 Experimental Results 
Section 6.3.1 denotes the Experimental Results associated with SSE Inverted Index 
Construction, Section 6.3.2 denotes the Experimental Results associated with SSE 
Inverted Index Searching, while Section 6.3.3 denotes the Experimental Results 
associated with the comparison of SSE and plaintext Information Retrieval (IR). 
Please note that all Results presented in this dissertation represent average values 
obtained over ten executions of each experiment. 
6.3.1 SSE Inverted Index Construction 
Section 6.3.1.1 denotes the Experimental Results associated with generating a 
plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Inverted Index and Section 6.3.1.2 denotes the 
                                                     
 
27
 The statistics shown in Table 18 were generated by executing the Stat_Counter.java 
program on each Data Set. 
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Experimental Results associated with converting an IR Inverted Index into an SSE 
Inverted Index.  Section 6.3.1.3 denotes the Experimental Results associated with 
encrypting an entire Document Collection, while Section 6.3.1.4 and Section 6.3.1.5  
denote the Experimental Results associated with uploading both the encrypted 
Document Collection and the SSE Inverted Index to the Server.  Section 6.3.1.6 
presents a set of aggregate Experimental Results (from Section 6.3.1.1 – Section 
6.3.1.5) covering the set of all activities associated with constructing an SSE 
Inverted Index. 
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6.3.1.1 IR Inverted Index Construction 
 
Figure 33: Information Retrieval (IR) Inverted Index Construction Time vs. Number of Terms in Collection. 
 
Figure 33 denotes the Experimental Results associated with generating a plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Inverted Index for each Test Data 
Set outlined previously.  Figure 33 compares the time taken to generate the IR Inverted Index against the number of Terms in the Document 
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Collection; that is, the Test Data Set, from which the IR Inverted Index is being generated.  As can be seen in Figure 33, the time associated with 
constructing an IR Inverted Index appears to increase linearly as the number of Terms in the underlying Document Collection increases.  In 
relation to Test Data, an IR Inverted Index was generated for Test Data Set 6 (approximately 5 million Terms) in approximately 7.6 seconds. 
The Results shown in Figure 33 were obtained by executing IR_Inverted_Index_Construction_Time.java on each Data Set 
outlined previously. 
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6.3.1.2 SSE Inverted Index Construction 
 
Figure 34: SSE Inverted Index Construction Time vs. No of Postings in IR Inverted Index. 
 
Figure 34 denotes the Experimental Results associated with converting a plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Inverted Index into an SSE Inverted 
Index for each Data Set outlined previously.  Figure 34 compares the time taken to generate the SSE Inverted Index against the number of 
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Postings in the IR Inverted Index from which the SSE Inverted Index is generated.  For the first four Test Data Sets (DS1 – DS4), the time 
associated with constructing an SSE Inverted Index appears to increase linearly as the number of Postings in the underlying IR Inverted Index 
increases; however the time taken to generate an SSE Inverted Index for DS5 and DS6 increases dramatically (when compared to the number 
of Postings in the underlying IR Inverted Index).  In relation to Test Data Sets, an SSE Inverted Index was generated for Test Data Set 4 (281,363 
Postings – approximately 3.2 Postings per Lexicon Term) in 1.5 seconds.  For Test Data Set 5 (1,672,576 Postings – approximately 6.5 Postings 
per Lexicon Term), an SSE Inverted Index was generated in 4 minutes 48 seconds.  For Test Data Set 6 (3,138,449 Postings – approximately 8.3 
Postings per Lexicon Term), an SSE Inverted Index was generated in 24 minutes 34 seconds. 
The Results shown in Figure 34 were obtained by executing SSE_Inverted_Index_Construction_Time.java on each Data Set 
outlined previously. 
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6.3.1.3 Document Collection Encryption 
 
Figure 35: Document Collection Encryption Time vs. Number of Terms in Collection. 
 
Figure 35 denotes the Experimental Results associated with encrypting the Document Collections comprising each of the Test Data Sets.  Figure 
35 compares the time taken to encrypt each Document Collection against the total number of Terms contained within each Document 
Collection.  As can be seen in Figure 35, the time associated with encrypting the Document Collection appears to increase linearly as the 
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number of Terms in the underlying Document Collection increases.  In relation to Test Data Sets, the Document Collection associated with Test 
Data Set 6 was encrypted in 40 seconds. 
The Results shown in Figure 35 were obtained by executing File_Encryption_Time.java on each Data Set outlined previously. 
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6.3.1.4 SSE Inverted Index Upload 
 
Figure 36: SSE Inverted Index Upload Time vs. Size of SSE Inverted Index. 
 
Figure 36 denotes the Experimental Results associated with uploading an SSE Inverted Index (generated from each Test Data Set) to the Server.  
Figure 36 compares the time taken to upload the SSE Inverted Index to the Server against the size of the SSE Inverted Index.  As can be seen in 
Figure 36, the time associated with uploading the SSE Inverted Index to the Server appears to increase linearly as the size of the SSE Inverted 
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Index increases.  In relation to Test Data, the SSE Inverted Index associated with Test Data Set 6 (325MB) was uploaded to the Server in 47.5 
seconds. 
The reader should be aware that the Experimental Results presented in Figure 36 includes the time taken to upload the SSE Inverted Index to 
the Server, as well as the time taken to serialise the SSE Inverted Index to disk (once the SSE Inverted Index has been received by the Server). 
The Results shown in Figure 36 were obtained by executing SSE_Upload_Timer.java. 
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6.3.1.5 Encrypted Document Collection Upload 
 
Figure 37: Encrypted Document Collection Upload Time vs. Encrypted Document Collection Size. 
 
Figure 37 denotes the Experimental Results associated with uploading an encrypted Document Collection (generated from each Test Data Set) 
to the Server.  Figure 37 compares the time taken to upload the encrypted Document Collection to the Server against the size of the encrypted 
Document Collection.  As can be seen in Figure 37, the time associated with uploading the encrypted Document Collection to the Server 
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appears to increase linearly as the size of the encrypted Document Collection increases.  In relation to Test Data, the encrypted Document 
Collection associated with Test Data Set 6 (32.5MB) was uploaded to the Server in 46.8 seconds. 
The reader should be aware that the Experimental Results presented in Figure 37 include the time taken to upload the encrypted Document 
Collection to the Server, as well as the time taken to store the encrypted Document Collection on disk (once the encrypted Document 
Collection has been received by the Server). 
The Results shown in Figure 37 were obtained by executing SSE_Upload_Timer.java; that is, the same software as used in Section 6.3.1.4 
previously. 
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6.3.1.6 Aggregate Results 
 
Figure 38: SSE Inverted Index Construction Composite. 
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Figure 38 denotes the total time taken to create an IR Inverted Index, convert it to an SSE Inverted Index, encrypt the associated Document 
Collection and upload both the SSE Inverted Index and the encrypted Document Collection to the Server for each Test Data Set outlined 
previously. 
In relation to Test Data, the whole process of constructing an SSE Inverted Index and uploading all associated data to the Server took 10.5 
seconds for Test Data Set 4.  To carry out the same work on Test Data Set 5 took 5 minutes 50 seconds, while carrying out the same work on 
Test Data Set 6 took 26 minutes 56 seconds. 
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6.3.2 SSE Inverted Index Querying 
Section 6.3.2.1 denotes the Experimental Results associated with generating an 
Encrypted Search String (ESS) for SSE, while Section 6.3.2.2 denotes the 
Experimental Results associated with searching an SSE Inverted Index.  Finally, 
Section 6.3.2.3  denotes the Experimental Results associated with searching the SSE 
Inverted Index and downloading all matching Documents to the Client (in ZIP File 
Format). 
6.3.2.1 ESS Generation 
 
Figure 39: Encrypted Search String (EES) Generation Time vs. Number of Terms in 
Document Collection. 
 
Figure 39 denotes the Experimental Results associated with generating Encrypted 
Search Strings (ESS) for SSE.   
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For each Lexicon Term within the Test Data Sets outlined previously, an ESS; that is, 
a keyed hash, was generated.  As can be seen in Figure 39, the time taken to 
generate an ESS is by no means constant.  The Experimental Results appear to show 
that the more ESS that are generated, the faster the execution time of the 
underlying Keyed_Hash() Method. 
The Results shown in Figure 37 were obtained by executing 
ESS_Generation_Time.java. 
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6.3.2.2 Identifying and Decrypting Matching Postings 
 
Figure 40: SSE Search Time vs. Number of Matching Postings in SSE Inverted Index. 
 
Figure 40 denotes the Experimental Results associated with searching an SSE Inverted Index and identifying (and decrypting) the Postings 
associated with the most frequently occurring Lexicon Term within the underlying Document Collection.  Figure 40 compares the time taken to 
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search the SSE Inverted Index against the number of Postings associated with the most frequently occurring Lexicon Term within the 
underlying Document Collection. 
In relation to Test Data, the SSE Inverted Index associated with Test Data Set 6 was searched and all Postings associated with the most 
frequently occurring Lexicon Term (18,828 Postings) were identified in 432 milliseconds. 
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6.3.2.3 Aggregate Results 
 
Figure 41: Data Set Size vs. Search and Download Time. 
 
Figure 41 denotes the Experimental Results associated with searching an SSE Inverted Index for the most frequently occurring Lexicon Term 
within the underlying Document Collection and returning all matching Documents to the Client.  Figure 41 compares the time taken to search 
the SSE Inverted Index and return all matching Documents against the size of the Document Collection returned.   
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The reader should be aware that the Experimental Results presented in Figure 41 also include the time taken to encapsulate the set of all 
matching Documents within a ZIP File, which is then returned to the Client. 
In relation to Test Data, the set of matching Document associated with the most frequently occurring Lexicon Term contained within Test Data 
Set 6 was searched and all Documents returned to the Client (32.5 MB) in 2 minutes 7 seconds.
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6.3.3 Performance of SSE vs. Plaintext Information 
Retrieval (IR) 
Section 6.3.3.1 denotes the Experimental Results associated with the comparison of 
plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) uploading and SSE uploading, while Section 
6.3.3.2 denotes the Experimental Results associated with the comparison of 
plaintext IR Inverted Index querying and SSE Inverted Index querying. 
6.3.3.1 Plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Uploading vs. SSE 
Uploading 
 
Figure 42: Plaintext IR Uploading vs. SSE Uploading. 
 
Figure 42 denotes the Experimental Results associated with the comparison of 
traditional plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) uploading and SSE uploading.  Those 
values associated with IR uploading in Figure 42 represent the time taken to upload 
the Document Collection associated with each Test Data Set from the Client 
machine to the Server.  Those values associated with SSE uploading in Figure 42 
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represent the time taken to generate the SSE Inverted Index, encrypt the associated 
Document Collection, and uploading both the Inverted Index and encrypted 
Document Collection to the Server.  From Figure 42, it is immediately obvious that 
the amount of time necessary for SSE uploading increases in a non-linear manner 
when compared to the amount of time necessary for plaintext IR uploading. 
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6.3.3.2 Plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) Querying vs. SSE 
Querying 
 
Figure 43: Plaintext IR Querying vs. SSE Querying. 
 
Figure 43 denotes the Experimental Results associated with the comparison of 
traditional plaintext Information Retrieval (IR) querying and SSE querying.   
The Experimental Results presented in Figure 43  consist of the time taken to 
identify the set of all Postings associated with the most frequently occurring 
Lexicon Term in the underlying Document Collection, and encapsulating the set of 
all matching Document within a ZIP File which is then returned to the Client.   
As was the case with Figure 42 previously, it is immediately obvious from Figure 43 
that the amount of time necessary for SSE querying increases in a non-linear 
manner when compared to the amount of time necessary for plaintext IR querying. 
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7. Evaluation 
In relation to searching an SSE Inverted Index, the Research Results provide 
additional proof of the efficiency of SSE when implemented in software.  The 
implementation of SSE developed as part of this dissertation was able to identify 
and decrypt a single Posting associated with a given Lexicon Term in approximately 
22 microseconds (μs).  This performance is comparable with the implementations 
of SSE developed by Kamara et al. (2012)28 and Cash et al. (2013) 29 previously.  
Regarding the efficiency of constructing an SSE Inverted Index, the Research Results 
are somewhat inconclusive.  Given the five steps involved in constructing an SSE 
Inverted Index30, each step in the implementation of SSE produced as part of this 
dissertation performed as expected with the exception of the second step: 
Converting an IR Inverted Index to an SSE Inverted Index.  For Test Data Set 1 (DS1) 
through Test Data Set 4 (DS4), an SSE Inverted Index was generated from an 
existing IR Inverted Index in a time linear to the number of Postings stored in the IR 
Inverted Index; however, for DS5 and DS6, this apparent linear performance 
decreased dramatically.  Despite investigating the problem at length, the author has 
                                                     
 
28
 7.3 Microseconds (μs) per Posting. 
29
 100 Microseconds (μs) per Posting. 
30
 1) Generating an IR Inverted Index, 2) Converting IR Inverted Index to SSE Inverted Index, 3) 
Encrypting Document Collection, 4) Uploading SSE Inverted Index to Server and 5) Uploading 
Encrypted Document Collection to Server. 
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been unable to diagnose the exact cause of this performance degradation.  The 
author feels this decrease in performance can be attributed to a combination of 
one or more of the following: 1) The Java Virtual Machines (JVM) Garbage 
Collection functionality, 2) Insufficient Java Heap memory, 3) The use of String 
Objects in the Encrypted_Array_Node Class, 4) The size of the SSE Inverted 
Index, and 5) The requirement of the HashMap iterator() Method to store 
an additional copy of the IR Inverted Index HashMap on the Java Heap while the 
SSE Inverted Index is being constructed. 
Regarding the first and second point, the author dynamically analysed the 
‘CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine’ application using both the Java Mission 
Control and Java Flight Recorder applications.  In both cases, the author noted that 
the JVM Garbage Collector was extremely active (eradicating up to 2GB of Objects 
from the Java Heap on a regular basis) (see Figure 44).   
 
Figure 44: Java Heap Memory Usage and Garbage Collection Statistics for SSE Inverted 
Index Construction. 
 
Regarding points one, two and three, it is evident that a significant number of 
Objects are being stored on the Java Heap as the implementation of SSE converts 
the IR Inverted Index to an SSE Inverted Index.  The author feels that one possible 
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explanation for this is the use of String Objects in the 
Encrypted_Array_Node Class.  String Objects are used in the 
Encrypted_Array_Node Class to store encrypted Document IDs, encrypted 
Indexes of subsequent Postings, as well as keys required to encrypt/decrypt 
subsequent Postings.  Given that String is a form of Object - and not a primitive 
data type – all String Objects are therefore stored in the Heap area of the Java 
Virtual Machines (JVM) memory (Oracle, 2015a). 
Regarding points one, two and four, the author noted that the SSE Inverted Index 
associated with DS5 was 171MB in size, while the SSE Inverted Index associated 
with DS6 was 325MB in size.  When compared to their plaintext equivalent, the DS5 
IR Inverted Index is 25MB in size (146MB smaller than its SSE counterpart), while 
the DS6 IR Inverted Index is 42.8MB (282.2MB smaller than its SSE counterpart).  
Evidently the SSE Inverted Index associated with both DS5 and DS6 occupy a 
significant amount of memory.  The presence of such large Objects in the Java Heap 
obviously reduces the amount of space available for subsequent Objects; therefore 
increasing the frequency of Garbage Collection (Oracle, 2015a). 
Regarding points one, two and five, the iterator() method of the HashMap 
Class may also be a factor in the performance degradation associated with DS5 and 
DS6.  As part of the process of converting the IR Inverted Index to an SSE Inverted 
Index, the IR Inverted Index must first be loaded into the Java Heap, with each entry 
in the IR Inverted Index then being examined and subsequently added to the SSE 
Inverted Index.  In order to examine each entry in the IR Inverted Index, the 
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iterator() method must be executed on the HashMap Object underlying the 
IR Inverted Index (the HashMap Class does not support iteration in any other way).  
In order to operate,   the iterator() method create must first create an exact 
replica of the IR Inverted Index HashMap on the Heap (that supports iteration); 
therefore doubling the amount of Heap space associated with the IR Inverted Index 
(Oracle, 2015c).  As indicated previously, the IR Inverted Index associated with DS5 
is 25MB in size (increasing to 50MB during SSE Inverted Index Construction as a 
result of using the iterator() method), while the IR Inverted Index associated 
with DS6 is 42.8MB (increasing to 85.6MB during SSE Inverted Index Construction as 
a result of using the iterator() method).  As mentioned previously, the 
presence of such large Objects on the Java Heap reduces the amount of space 
available for additional Objects and also has the effect of increasing the frequency 
of Garbage Collection (Oracle, 2015a). 
The author has identified two other potential causes of the performance 
degradation associated with DS5 and DS6: 1) Hash Collisions Occurring As A Result 
Of Inserting Keys Into The SSE Inverted Index HashMap Object, and 2) The Natural 
Performance Degradation Associated With An Ever Expanding HashMap Object; 
however the authors Research appears to have ruled both potential causes out. 
Regarding Hash Collisions in a HashMap, the author noted that the location of an 
Object within a HashMap is determined by the value resulting from executing the 
hashCode() method associated with the Object being inserted into the 
HashMap.  In the event that two Objects produce the same hashCode() value, 
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the HashMap Class must then execute the compare() method associated with 
both Objects to determine whether or not both Objects are in fact equivalent to 
each other (Oracle, 2015c).  Personally, the author does not feel that Hash 
Collisions are an issue in theis implementation of SSE as the hashCode() method 
associated with the String Class produces a 32 bit hash value (approximately 4.3 
billion different Hash Values) (Oracle, 2015e); therefore making Hash Collisions 
highly unlikely for data sets the size of DS5 and DS6. 
Regarding the natural performance degradation associated with an ever expanding 
HashMap, the author has noted that a Java HashMap Object must be created with 
a specified initial capacity; that is, number of expected entries, and a specified 
expected load; that is, the percentage of the initial capacity that must be used 
before the capacity of the HashMap is increased.  In the event that that the load 
specified for the HashMap is exceeded, a new HashMap Object must then be 
constructed (this is done automatically by the HashMap Class).  The process of 
constructing a new HashMap Object requires that each entry in the existing 
HashMap Object be retrieved, re-hashed, and inserted into the new – larger – 
HashMap Object (Oracle, 2015c).  Personally, the author does not feel this is an 
issue that affects this implementation of SSE as the author has taken the initial 
capacity and load factor of the SSE HashMap into consideration and constructed 
the HashMap in a manner that does not require the HashMap to be expanded. 
Regarding Research Results relating to upload speeds and download speeds, the 
reader should be aware that a localhost web server was used during Testing; as 
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such, the time associated with uploading and downloading data may appear 
significantly faster than those which are achievable using a live system. 
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8. Conclusions and Further Research 
Section 8.1 presents the Conclusions derived from the authors work on this 
dissertation, while Section 8.2 discusses potential further Research. 
8.1 Conclusions 
Given the similarity between Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) and plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR), it is inevitable that comparisons will be made between 
the two.  While having a number of goals and functions in common, the fact 
remains that the primary goal of SSE is to provide Data and Query Privacy.  Given 
this – as well as the fact that SSE operates in a manner that differs greatly from 
plaintext IR - the author is of the option that SSE should be viewed as a separate 
paradigm in the context of Information Retrieval, and not an extension of plaintext 
IR.   
In order to provide Data and Query Privacy, SSE requires a significant amount of 
additional processing time to carry out a task when compared to the processing 
time associated with carrying out the same task using plaintext IR.  In terms of the 
performance overhead of using SSE, the Research Results show that little or no 
correlation exists between the time associated with carrying out a task using 
plaintext IR, and carrying out the same task using SSE (see Section 6.3.3).  In 
general, the Research Results have shown that the time taken to carry out a task 
using SSE is greater than the time taken to carry out the same task using plaintext 
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IR; nonetheless, this is to be expected given that the process of uploading a 
Document Collection to the Server using SSE requires the Client to first generate an 
SSE Inverted Index, encrypt the underlying Document Collection and then upload 
both to the Server, as well as the need for the Sever to decrypt Postings as part of 
SSE querying. 
The Research Results show that carrying out a task using SSE is directly proportional 
to the amount of information involved.  In the case of constructing an IR Inverted 
Index, the Research Results show that the time taken to generate an IR Inverted 
Index is directly proportional to the number of Terms contained in the underlying 
Document Collection (see Section 6.3.1.1).  Converting the same IR Inverted Index 
to an SSE Inverted Index is directly proportional to the number of Postings 
contained within the IR Inverted Index31 (see Section 6.3.1.2), while the time taken 
to encrypt the underlying Document Collection is directly proportional to the 
number of Terms contained within the Document Collection (see Section 6.3.1.3).  
In relation to searching in SSE, the time taken to identify and decrypt the set of 
Postings associated with a given Lexicon Term is directly proportional to the 
number of Postings (see Section 6.3.2.2).  
                                                     
 
31
 With the exception of Test Data Set 5 and Test Data Set 6 – see Section 7 and Section 8.2 for 
further explanation. 
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Regarding the question of whether or not SSE is efficient enough to be deployed in 
a Cloud environment, the author if of the opinion that the answer to this question is 
context dependant. 
If deployed in an environment whereby Search Results only have to be returned to 
the user in small quantities (such as an Internet Search Engine (For Example: ten 
results at a time)), then SSE would be more than efficient, irrespective of the size of 
the underlying Data Set (due to the fact that only a small number of Postings would 
need to be decrypted at a given time). 
If deployed in an environment whereby all Search Results must be returned at once 
(as was the case with the implementation of SSE developed as part of this 
dissertation, as well as the implementations developed by Kamara et al. (2012) and 
Cash et al. (2013), the author is of the opinion that SSE would only be suitable for 
small and medium sized Data Sets.  When applied to large Data Sets, SSE querying 
can become inefficient as its search time is directly proportional to the number of 
matching Postings (which is likely to be significant for large Data Sets). 
Regarding the possible commercialisation of SSE, the success of such a product 
would undoubtedly hinge on the knowledge of those people using the product.  
Users of such a product would need to be aware that SSE provides Data/Query 
Privacy in exchange for the efficiency associated with plaintext IR, and that an SSE 
Inverted Index – while slow to construct for large Data Sets – is designed to achieve 
efficient search speeds whilst maintaining Data Privacy. 
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8.2 Further Research 
Regarding the Literature Review carried out as part of this dissertation, the author 
would like to acknowledge that the description of the Inverted Index provided in 
Section 2.2 constitutes the Inverted Index in its most basic form; that is, denoting 
whether or not a Term is contained within a Document Collection, as well as support 
for single Term Queries only; nonetheless, the description provided is sufficient 
enough to cover the usage of the Inverted Index in SSE.  Manning et al. (2008) 
provides a comprehensive overview of the Inverted Index as it is used in plaintext 
IR, including numerous extensions to the description provided in this dissertation.  
Furthermore, the author would also like to acknowledge that the topic of Update 
Leakage; that is, Information Leakage resulting from changes being made to the SSE 
Inverted Index and the underlying Document Collection, was not covered in the 
Literature Review as it was deemed beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Kamara 
et al. (2012) and Van Liesdonk et al. (2010)  give a comprehensive overview of the 
topic. 
Regarding improvements to the Implementation of SSE developed as part of this 
dissertation, the author would like to diagnose and rectify the performance issues 
encountered when generating an SSE Inverted Index for large Data Sets.  In 
addition, the author would also like to apply secure coding practices to the 
implementation of SSE developed as part of this dissertation. 
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In relation to the aforementioned performance issue, the author feels the 
performance degradation associated with generating an SSE Inverted Index for 
large Data Sets is due to the use of String Objects for storing ciphertext.  
All built-in cryptographic methods of the Java library output ciphertext in byte[] 
array form initially (Oracle, 2015b; Oracle, 2015d).  In the Crypto_Methods Class 
utilised as part of the authors implementation of SSE, each byte[] array produced 
as part of a cryptographic operation is converted to a Base64 encoded String 
Object before being returned to the calling component.  The decision to use 
String Objects to store ciphertext – instead of byte[] arrays - was taken by the 
author with a view to simplifying the process of debugging cryptographic 
operations.   
In hindsight, the author now realises that each item of ciphertext produced by the 
Crypto_Methods Class exists in two forms on the Java Heap: In byte[] array 
form, and String form.  Evidently this represents a significant amount of Heap 
space wastage.  For this reason alone, the author feels it may be a worthwhile 
exercise re-developing the implementation of SSE using byte[] arrays instead of 
String Objects with a view to improving performance when dealing with larger 
Data Sets; that is, DS5, DS6. 
In addition to the use of String Objects, another potential cause of the 
aforementioned performance degradation may be the applications reliance on 
automated memory management.  At no point during the implementation of the 
‘CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine’ application was manual memory 
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management utilised; that is, manual de-allocation of memory.  All memory 
management associated with the application is managed by the Java Virtual 
Machine and automated calls to the Java Garbage Collector.  Given this, the author 
feels it may be a worthwhile exercise re-engineering the application with manual 
memory management in mind, with a view to improving the performance of the 
application when generating an SSE Inverted Index for large Data Sets. 
In relation to secure coding, the author readily admits that no secure coding 
principles were applied during the development of both the ‘PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine’ and ‘CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine’ applications.  Given that 
‘CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine’ is a data security application, the author 
would like to apply secure coding principles to the application at some point in the 
future. 
Regarding extending the functionality of the Implementation of SSE developed as 
part of this dissertation, the author would like to investigate the feasibility of 
incorporating support for multiple term queries (as demonstrated by Cash et al. 
(2013)), as well as including support for adding and deleting Documents from the 
underlying Document Collection (and updating the SSE Inverted Index appropriately 
– on the Server side - as demonstrated by Kamara et al. (2012) and Van Liesdonk et 
al. (2010). 
Furthermore, given the size of the Inverted Indexes produced by the 
implementation of SSE produced as part of this dissertation, the author believes 
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that the topic of Inverted Index compression may also be worth researching 
(Luenberger, 2006, p.290). 
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